FDI decision-making and multinationalization by Asikainen, Tuomas
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FDI decision-making and 
multinationalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
                                                                                 Tuomas Tapani Asikainen 
                                                                                 University of Helsinki 
                                                                                 Faculty of Social Sciences                            
                                                                                 Economics 
                                                                                 Master’s Thesis 
                                                                                 May 2016 
  
 
     
Tiedekunta/Osasto – Fakultet/Sektion – Faculty 
Faculty of Social Sciences 
  
Laitos – Institution – Department                                       
Department of Political and Economic Studies 
Tekijä – Författare  – Author 
Tuomas Asikainen 
Työn nimi – Arbetets titel – Title 
FDI decision-making and multinationalization 
Oppiaine – Läroämne – Subject 
Economics 
Työn laji – Arbetets art – Level 
Master’s Thesis 
Aika – Datum – Month and year 
May 2016 
Sivumäärä – Sidoantal – Number of pages         
72 
Tiivistelmä – Referat – Abstract  
Foreign direct investment (FDI) flows have increased tremendously in the past twenty years, and these 
investments have grown especially in developing economies. FDI has become an efficient mechanism to 
increase economic development in poor countries. This thesis opens up the decision-making process of 
developed countries related to FDI decisions. The main focus is to concentrate on FDI in developing countries, 
and how they try to find relevant policies in order to attract more FDI flows. Some relevant empirical findings 
between China and Sub-Saharan Africa are shown to support the benchmark model. The model does not go 
through every possible aspect of FDI but shows how different southern technology frontiers and risks in 
production might affect the final FDI flows in developing countries.         
The benchmark model is a North-South model where the North and South are the developed and developing 
country, respectively. The main feature of this model is that a northern firm might opt out of doing FDI, if 
the technology frontier in a southern industry is too low for a northern firm with a relatively high technology. 
This situation might cause a risk of FDI quality failure, where the production chain in the South fails to 
complete successfully. This kind of failure is possible, if the skills or knowledge of the southern workers is not 
high enough. The benchmark model is later extended with the innovative and imitative South in this thesis, 
and lastly technology-neutral risks are introduced and added to the benchmark model.         
The benchmark model shows that only firms with intermediate technology levels in the North move 
production to the South or become multinationals. Additionally, more multinational production increases 
the technology frontier in the South and eventually decreases the risk of FDI quality failure. This 
development leads to more FDI flows and widens the technology spectrum of the multinational firms. The 
aim of governments in developing countries is to increase their technology frontiers in different industries. 
This thesis goes through many important policy parameters which can improve the technology frontier in 
the South and eventually lead to more multinational production.   
Avainsanat – Nyckelord – Keywords 
Foreign Direct Investment, Multinational Enterprises, Technology Frontier, Risk, Imitation, 
Developing Countries 
  
Table of Contents 
1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 FDI, economic growth and inequality ......................................................................... 3 
1.2 Research questions ...................................................................................................... 5 
1.3 The structure of the thesis .......................................................................................... 6 
2 Literature review ................................................................................................................. 6 
2.1 Previous models ........................................................................................................... 6 
2.2 O-ring theory by Kremer ............................................................................................. 8 
2.2.1 Stylized facts and the O-ring theory ......................................................................... 9 
2.2.2 Imperfect matching ............................................................................................... 10 
3 FDI flows from China to Sub-Saharan Africa ..................................................................... 11 
3.1 Risks and possibilities in China-SSA FDI .................................................................... 13 
3.2 Local labor and contracts with China ....................................................................... 16 
3.3 A case study of China-Nigeria FDI ............................................................................. 18 
4 The model of risk and technology content of FDI ............................................................ 21 
4.1 Production technology and the risk of FDI quality failure ....................................... 21 
4.2 FDI decision-making of the northern firms .............................................................. 25 
4.2.1 Machines in the North as substitutes for southern labor ........................................ 28 
4.3 Extensive and intensive margins of FDI .................................................................... 31 
4.4 Technology frontier evolution and the dynamics of FDI ......................................... 32 
4.5 Steady state................................................................................................................ 34 
4.6 Comparative static analysis and government policies ............................................. 38 
4.7 Predictions and a comparison with actual data ....................................................... 43 
4.8 Problems and possible extensions of the model ..................................................... 46 
5 Southern imitation with innovation and the risks of FDI ................................................. 47 
5.1 Imitation parameter 𝑖 ................................................................................................ 48 
5.2 Risk parameter 𝑧 and technology-neutral country risks 𝑟 ...................................... 50 
6 Summary and discussion ................................................................................................... 54 
References ........................................................................................................................... 56 
Appendix A ........................................................................................................................... 60 
Appendix B ........................................................................................................................... 69 
 
 
  
List of symbols 
 
1
1−𝛼
                     Price elasticity of demand for each variety of an industry      
Г(∙)                     Learning function 
𝛿𝐷                        Depreciation rate of the South’s learning experiences 
𝛿𝐿                        Learning speed in the South  
Θ𝑆                       Technology content of inward FDI 
𝜃                          Technology level of a northern firm 
𝜆(𝑠)                    The intensity of effort used to carry out step 𝑠 
𝜋𝑆 ,  𝜋𝑁                Profits in the South and North 
1
1−𝜌
                      Elasticity of substitution between any two steps 𝑠     
𝑐𝑙(𝜃)                   Cost function 
𝑓𝑆,  𝑓𝑁                Fixed costs in the South and North 
𝐺(𝜃)                    Cumulative distribution function 
𝑖                            Imitation in the South 
𝐾                          Infrastructure in the South 
𝑝𝑗(𝑖)                    Price of variety 𝑖 of industry 𝑗 
𝑄𝑡
𝑆                        Discounted multinational production at time 𝑡 
𝑟                           Technology-neutral risk 
𝑠                           Number of steps in production 
𝑇𝑡
𝑆                        Technology frontier in the South at time 𝑡 
𝑇0
𝑆                        Initial technology frontier in the South 
𝑤𝑆,  𝑤𝑁               Wage rates in the South and North 
  
𝑋𝑆                        Multinational production 
𝑥𝑗(𝑖)                    Demand for variety 𝑖 of industry 𝑗  
𝑧                           Risk parameter of FDI 
 
 
 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an investment in a business by an investor from 
another country, and the foreign investor also has control over the company purchased. 
The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines control as 
owning 10% or more of the business. Businesses that make foreign direct investments 
are often called multinational corporations (MNCs) or multinational enterprises (MNEs). 
MNEs can make a direct investment by creating a new foreign enterprise which is called 
a green field investment. For example a subsidiary in a foreign country is an investment 
of this type. Another type of FDI is a brown field investment which can for example be 
an acquisition of a foreign firm. A firm can be merged with another firm in a receiving 
country of FDI. The other important concept is multinationalization which is not that 
easy to define. My own definition of multinationalization is that a firm decides to start 
doing FDI in a different country/countries where its headquarters is located. A MNE is 
thus operating or at least partly controlling the business abroad in one or more countries 
simultaneously.    
One of my main interests in this thesis is to analyze the decision-making process of firms 
doing FDI from the perspective of developing countries. Governments in developing 
countries have to understand how the developed countries decide their foreign 
investment location in order to attract FDI. The next chapter is going to support the fact, 
that FDI can be beneficial for developing countries. The connection between FDI, 
economic growth, poverty, and inequality is analyzed there. This thesis deals with the 
following issues related to the decision-making process of firms doing FDI: 
1) Differences in technology (frontier) levels between the FDI host countries and 
the firms doing FDI 
2) Risk of FDI quality failures because of technology gaps 
3) Intellectual property rights (IPR), innovation and imitation in the host countries 
of FDI 
4) Technology-neutral risks for all industries in the receiving countries of FDI 
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FDIs between developed and developing world have increased very rapidly in the last 
ten to twenty years. As expected, Asia is the biggest receiver of FDI (measured in year 
2014) when talking about developing economies. Asia had FDI inflows of roughly $US 
465 000 millions compared to Africa’s $US 54 000 millions in year 2014 (UNCTAD 2016). 
Figure 1 below shows how Africa has quickly increased its part of the world’s FDI flows. 
In 1990, Africa was receiving practically zero FDI, but today it is not any more an 
insignificant factor in the field of FDI. 
Traditionally FDI flows have gone to the industrialized countries, but developing 
countries have become increasingly attractive FDI destinations in recent years. One of 
the main fears for Western countries is a risk of losing competitiveness because of low 
production costs in the emerging countries (Hajzler 2014). For example China has 
received a lot of FDI flows in recent years, and China’s economic growth has definitely 
benefited from this. In the future Africa might be a huge possibility for FDI firms, and 
this could help Africa to speed up its economic development. It is possibly a win-win 
situation, so one would expect increasing FDI flows to Africa in the following ten or 
twenty years. To sum it up, FDI can be very beneficial for poor economies which acutely 
need foreign capital and investments in order to improve their economic development.  
 
Figure 1: Inward FDI flows in Africa (millions of $US), 1980-2014 (Source: UNCTAD 2016) 
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1.1 FDI, economic growth and inequality 
 
I want to include this subchapter into my introductory part of this thesis, because it is 
really important to understand why FDI might be desirable for an emerging country. 
Economic growth and inequality together are a good combination of measures for the 
economic development of emerging countries. There are many studies which have 
tackled the connection between FDI, economic growth and inequality/poverty. Few of 
these studies are opened up a little more in the following sections.  
The connection between FDI and economic growth is not as straightforward as many 
people might think. There has been a lot of researches on this connection, and the 
results are mixed. Borensztein et al. (1998) find that FDI is an important vehicle for the 
transfer of technology benefiting the growth of a receiving country more than domestic 
investments. They also find that FDI can have positive effects on economic growth only 
if the host country has a minimum threshold stock of human capital. In other words, 
there has to be enough skilled labor in order to learn from new advanced technologies 
and to get economic growth. This is one of the main reasons why FDI flows usually go to 
the more advanced and matured economies.  
Azman-Saini et al. (2010) make a finding which suggest that FDI might have positive 
effects on economic growth only if a certain level of economic freedom is achieved. They 
find that freedom of economic activities in the host country makes a difference when 
talking about FDI effects on the long-run economic growth. They define economic 
freedom by using four different aspects of it, and they are 
1) Free and competitive markets 
2) Labor laws 
3) The protection of property rights 
4) Freedom of exchange across borders 
Firstly, they point out that less regulation is good for economic development. Firms are 
more willing to invest in foreign countries where the markets function well. One 
example is financial markets where regulation is bad for possible MNEs. Secondly, elastic 
labor markets make knowledge spillovers from MNEs to local firms possible. Workers 
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who have been in MNEs might have difficulties to join local companies, if the labor laws 
are very restricted. Thirdly, countries with strong property rights are able to attract FDI 
of higher technology firms (Javorcik 2004). Many of these firms rely their production on 
strong property rights. Lastly, free export markets for the local firms might help them to 
enter the international markets. The main lesson from all of this is that certain minimum 
level of economic freedom might be needed in order to have full impact from FDI. It is 
thus very important for developing countries to firstly increase their economic freedom, 
and only after that start aiming to attract FDI inflows.    
There is one common determinant of the two previous studies alongside many others, 
and that is the absorptive capacity of a host country of FDI. Absorptive capacity basically 
determines the efficiency of FDI for a host country. The previously mentioned economic 
freedom is one element of absorptive capacity, as is the minimum level of human capital 
by Borensztein et al. (1998). Absorptive capacity thus includes a large set of different 
features, and it basically tells the capacity of a country or a firm to absorb technological 
information.    
Next I want to introduce the relationship between FDI, inequality, and poverty. Gohou 
and Soumaré (2012) did research in some African countries and found that FDI net 
inflows reduce poverty in the host economies there. They used human development 
index (HDI) and the real per capita GDP as measures of welfare. The first important 
observation they made was that FDI had different welfare effects among different 
regions. Secondly, they found that FDI’s impact on welfare is more effective in poorer 
than richer countries. This finding should make low income economies very encouraged 
to fight against poverty.        
Basu and Guariglia (2007) found a positive relationship between FDI and inequality. This 
finding is especially strong in an environment, where poor people are unable to access 
new technologies because of low initial human capital. This fact can widen the gap 
between the rich and the poor and thus increase inequality. As noted earlier in 
Borensztein et al. (1998), some threshold amount of human capital is needed to get 
positive effects from FDI to economic growth. Same is true with inequality; in this case 
certain amount of human capital is needed, so that poor people are able to become 
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entrepreneurs and catch-up with the rich, as Basu and Guariglia (2007) describe in their 
article.  
Wu and Hsu (2012) make similar findings as Basu and Guariglia (2007). They found a 
positive relationship between FDI and inequality which strengthens the idea of FDI’s 
harmful effects. Absorptive capacity is also a crucial factor in their research, and they 
use infrastructure and initial GDP as a proxy of it. Good infrastructure is important in the 
sense that the poor can have an access to new technologies. They find that FDI is 
associated with more inequality in the countries with less absorptive capacity and vice 
versa. A famous work of Kuznets (1955) claims that economic growth first increases 
inequality, and at some point inequality starts to decline. One would expect that 
economic growth increases the share of urban population where new technologies are 
used. Poorer rural areas might see no economic development at this stage, and thus it 
would also be important to introduce new technologies in rural areas to decrease 
inequality in the short-term.    
 
1.2 Research questions 
 
This thesis tries to tackle many different questions related to FDI, but there are few 
questions that rise above the others. Basically there are two questions which are tightly 
connected to each other, and they are 
1) How can developing countries attract more FDI? 
2) What is behind the decision of FDI firms to move production to developing 
countries? 
These two questions can be answered from the perspective of different parties. My goal 
is to answer these questions from the perspective of developing countries. The 
governments in developing countries try to understand what the firms doing FDI are 
actually thinking. There are many reasons for a choice of moving production to 
developing countries, but FDI firms with different technology levels are a special interest 
of a research in this thesis. Different risk factors of multinational production are also 
discussed in more detail.   
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1.3 The structure of the thesis   
 
This thesis continues so that chapter two goes through some literature of previous FDI 
models related to the main model used in this thesis. Chapter two also includes a closer 
look at the O-ring theory by Kremer (1993) which is closely related to the main model 
introduced later in the thesis. After going through some earlier models of FDI, chapter 
three introduces a special case of FDI flows from China to Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). That 
chapter is trying to arouse interest and support the main theoretical model in the 
following chapter. The relationship between China and SSA is a very current topic which 
is opened up by taking many different perspectives. 
A logical continuum for chapter three is an introduction of the main theoretical model 
of risk and technology content of FDI (Chang and Lu 2012) in chapter four. This chapter 
goes through the model in the context of “North-South” FDI. For example dynamics of 
FDI and comparative statics are done with the model in chapter four. Turning into 
chapter five, southern imitation and innovation by the model of He and Maskus (2012) 
are discussed and combined with the main model introduced in chapter four. Chapter 
five also discusses both technology-related risks and technology-neutral risks. This 
chapter tries to raise questions and give a new point of view related to FDI and 
multinationalization decisions. Lastly, chapter six concludes and summarizes all the most 
important and relevant issues discussed in the thesis.           
 
2 Literature review 
 
2.1 Previous models 
 
There has been a lot of different models in the history of FDI framework. First models 
come from the 1960s and since then lots of various paths have been taken related to 
this topic. My interest is to talk more about models which are close to the model I use 
in chapter four. I will not go through all of the models but choose the most relevant ones 
in this context. Usually the standard FDI literature assumes away the risk of FDI quality 
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failure. One example of this kind of article is written by Antrás and Helpman (2004). They 
assume that moving production to the South includes same risks in production as 
producing a good in the North. This kind of model suggest that most technologically 
advanced firms do FDI, but this is not supported by empirical findings. The model used 
in this thesis (Chang and Lu (2012)) specifically tackles this problem and takes FDI risk of 
quality into account.  
Next I want to go through the model of Costinot (2009). This model is a simple theory of 
international trade with endogenous technology differences across countries. An 
economy in this model consists of two large countries with a continuum of goods and 
one factor of production which is labor. The core of this model lies in the production of 
the goods, where each good has to be completed with a team. Under free trade larger 
teams specialize in producing the more complex goods. Team size increases with 
institutional quality and the complexity of a good but decreases with human capital per 
worker. There are increasing returns to scale in the performance of each task, but also 
uncertainty in the enforcement of each contract. These two effects have a trade-off, 
which makes northern firms to think about their FDI decisions.  
Glass and Saggi (1998) build a quality ladders product cycle model which introduces a 
similar property as the main model used in this thesis. They find that northern firms 
move production to the South because of low costs, but only for quality levels slightly 
above the southern technological frontier. The model of Antrás (2005) has similar kind 
of features as the model of Glass and Saggi. There exists a trade-off between lower costs 
of southern manufacturing and higher incomplete-contracting distortions associated 
with it. Thus, a possible incomplete nature of contracts can change the decision-making 
of a northern firm related to FDI, so that production is not moved to the South.    
All these models have more or less similar features as the model used in this thesis. Most 
of the models in the FDI literature only analyzes the benefits of moving production to 
the South, but only some of them can include risk in some form. The model of Chang 
and Lu (2012) introduces an exogenous risk parameter, which introduces the risk of 
inadequate skills and knowledge in the South compared to the technology of MNEs. This 
new feature makes the analysis of FDI decision-making process much more interesting 
and relevant in many ways.      
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2.2 O-ring theory by Kremer 
 
In chapter four I use a model where the idea of O-ring theory by Kremer (1993) is 
extended when talking about a risk of FDI quality failure. I find it very important to open 
up this model of Kremer more here, because it will be easier to understand the main 
model I use later. This particular theory is based on the idea that production processes 
have a continuum of tasks which have to be completed. If there exist mistakes or errors 
in one of these tasks, then the value of the product can be seriously decreased. This of 
course means that the more tasks a firm have in a production chain, the more it 
increases the probability of failing in production. Kremer also assumes that the 
probability of a mistake by one worker does not depend on mistakes by other workers.    
Kremer assumes that it is not possible to substitute many low-skilled workers for one 
high-skilled worker in a production chain of several tasks. He defines skill as a probability 
to complete a task successfully. For example a low-skilled worker could have a 
probability of 0.85 to complete a task. The probability for a high-skilled worker could be 
0.95 for example. The probability for successfully completing the production chain with 
three high or low skilled workers would now be 
 0.85 ∗ 0.85 ∗ 0.85 ≈ 𝟎. 𝟔𝟏 with three low-skilled workers 
 0.95 ∗ 0.95 ∗ 0.95 ≈ 𝟎. 𝟖𝟔 with three high-skilled workers 
To clarify things, I will present the basic O-ring production function which is 
                                                           𝐸(𝑦) = 𝑘𝛼(∏ 𝑞𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) 𝑛𝐵                                                     
where 𝐸(𝑦) is expected production, 𝑘 is capital, 𝑞𝑖 is the probability of 𝑖th worker to 
successfully complete a task, 𝑛 is the number of tasks and 𝐵 is output per worker with a 
single unit of capital, if all tasks are performed perfectly. This functional form is a basic 
Cobb-Douglas function. Firms are assumed to be risk-neutral, so expected production 
equals production in this case. Capital is so that there is a fixed supply of capital 𝑘∗, and 
a continuum of workers with an exogenous distribution of quality ϕ(𝑞). Supply of labor 
is inelastic, and workers do not make a labor-leisure choice here.    
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One interesting feature in this O-ring production function is that quantity cannot be 
substituted with quality within a single production chain. It is thus impossible to replace 
two or more low productive workers to one high productive worker. Increasing returns 
to skill are also assumed to be true at this stage. Kremer solves a competitive equilibrium 
in his article, but I only am going to present the most important results from the 
perspective of my thesis. In the analysis of Kremer firms maximize profits, and the 
market clears for capital, and for workers of all skill levels. 
The first and one of the most important findings is that in equilibrium workers with same 
skill levels work together within a single production chain. At this stage workers are 
assumed to have perfect matching, which means that the workers with similar skill levels 
work together. In the further analysis Kremer shows that firms are indifferent between 
the skill levels of their workers as long as the workers have same skill levels between 
them.  
 
2.2.1 Stylized facts and the O-ring theory   
 
Kremer presents some stylized facts of development and labor economics and compares 
them with his O-ring theory in his article. This chapter of his work connects theory and 
empirics nicely together. I am going to analyze the most important stylized facts when 
talking about production (chains) in developing countries. 
The first stylized fact says that “wage and productivity differentials between rich and 
poor countries are enormous”. The O-Ring theory explains this fact so that small 
differences in worker skill should make differences in productivity and wages even 
larger. More physical capital is also used with high-skilled workers than low-skilled 
workers in equilibrium. It is thus important for developing economies to raise their 
human capital level in order to attract physical capital flows into those countries.  
All this earlier analysis has assumed that the 𝑛 tasks are performed simultaneously, but 
now it is time to move on to sequential production analysis. Sequential production 
means that all the 𝑛 tasks are done one after another, not at the same time. This feature 
sounds more realistic with the real world. Kremer shows that it is optimal to allocate 
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workers with the highest 𝑞 in the later stages of production. This is intuitively quite 
reasonable, because low-skilled workers could destroy more of a production chain if 
allocated to later stages of production. For example with 𝑛 = 8, step seven is much 
more valuable than step two. The value of the product is obviously much higher at the 
later stage of a production chain. Kremer’s theory can also be discussed with another 
two stylized facts which are important for developing countries. They are in line with the 
O-ring theory, and those are “Poor countries have higher shares of primary production 
in GNP” and “Workers are paid more in industries with high value inputs”.      
Next stylized fact is “Rich countries specialize in complicated products”. It can also be 
interpreted to say that poor countries specialize in simpler technologies. Kremer 
assumes that if all tasks are completed perfectly, there are benefits to use these more 
complicated technologies. 𝐵(𝑛) is defined as the value of output per task if all 𝑛 tasks 
are performed perfectly with two properties: 𝐵′(0) > 0 and 𝐵′′(𝑛) < 0. The first 
property imply increasing benefits if more complex technology is used, and the second 
property says that the marginal benefit is decreasing with more complex technologies. 
For example in developing economies there is a serious risk of production failures in 
different tasks with more complex technologies because of low initial human capital and 
knowledge.        
 
2.2.2 Imperfect matching   
    
The assumption of perfect matching of workers is quite strict and unrealistic, because 
limited availability of certain level of workers might cause problems in matching. Kremer 
points out that higher level of population increases the marginal product of skill 
𝑑𝑤/𝑑𝑞𝑖 = 𝐸(∏ 𝑞𝑗𝑗≠𝑖 ) under imperfect matching. This is quite reasonable, because the 
probability of finding coworkers with similar skills is higher with higher level of 
population. Workers with same level of skills are also expected to have greater 
production in this case. 
People is thus expected to move from rural areas to cities (higher population) based on 
this theory. For example city clusters or training centers aim to have workers with similar 
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(usually high) skills in order to match workers better. In developing countries it is 
important to connect the largest cities with infrastructure in order to get more people 
with similar skills together. High skill level of coworkers increases also your marginal 
product. Training centers increase the level of skills of other workers and when this is 
known, it is useful to invest in skill even more.                   
In this earlier analysis 𝑞 is assumed to be exogenous, but it also is possible to endogenize 
𝑞. Kremer describes skill 𝑞 as a product of investment in education or effort 𝑒. The main 
finding I make out of Kremer’s is that small differences between countries in exogenous 
multiplier variables can have large effects in 𝑞 between different countries. One of these 
variables might be the quality of an education system for example. Kremer shows also 
that the parameter 𝑒 might increase a lot with an education subsidies because of 
multiplier effect. These kind of subsidies increase 𝑒 directly, and the subsidies also 
increase 𝑒 indirectly.          
 
3 FDI flows from China to Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
I want to start with an exceptionally good words by the former US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton (2011), which basically is a great summary of the situation in Africa: 
“Well, our view is that over the long run, investments in Africa should be sustainable and 
for the benefit of the African people. It is easy – and we saw that during colonial times – 
it is easy to come in, take out natural resources, pay off leaders, and leave. And when 
you leave, you don’t leave much behind for the people who are there. You don’t improve 
the standard of living. You don’t create a ladder of opportunity. We don’t want to see a 
new colonialism in Africa. We want, when people come to Africa and make investments, 
we want them to do well, but we also want them to do good. We don’t want them to 
undermine good governance. We don’t want them to basically deal with just the top 
elites and, frankly, too often pay for their concessions or their opportunities to invest.” 
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China and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have rapidly increased their cooperation related to 
FDI. Especially economic cooperation between those two has increased compared to 
more political connections in the 20th century. China’s “Going Global” policy was 
introduced in year 2002, and its aim was to promote China’s overseas investment 
activity. Between 2003 and 2009 China’s outward direct investments (ODI) rose from 
$33 billion to $230 billion (Cheung et al. 2012). More and more of those investments are 
going to the emerging economies in Africa.   
SSA has a huge economic growth potential, and that’s why it is a very interesting topic 
to make research on. A usual misunderstanding is that the economic potential of SSA is 
only based on the vast natural resources. China’s own economic development has 
increased the demand for energy there, and that’s why the interest in natural resources 
is quite logical in Africa. Of course this one-sided interest has been even more an issue 
at the beginning of the SSA economic development story, but in recent years Chinese 
investments have gone to various different industries. In fact, finance, construction, and 
manufacturing now make up half of total FDI in SSA (World Bank 2015). This number is 
very promising for the economies in SSA as a whole.  
 
Figure 2: Chinese FDI flows to SSA, 2003–13 (US$,millions) 
 
Chinese FDI outflows to SSA have dramatically increased since early 2000s, which is easy 
to see by looking at Figure 2. Actually China was almost a nonexistent player in SSA back 
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then when talking about FDI. The world sees and has seen foreign investments to China 
and U.S. for example, but the investments are surely going to accelerate in SSA with 
increasing amounts in the future.  
It is very important that the governments in SSA make right political decisions in order 
to get the development properly started from the perspective of economic development 
in the countries of SSA. Many African countries still have authoritarian regimes, which 
hinder the possibly better times for the people there. Proper government policies might 
get a poor country out of a development trap as we will see in later analysis. It can be 
concluded that now it is the time for African countries to attract strategic, job-creating 
investments from foreign investors, for example China. These following four 
improvements are a good way to start getting more FDI from China and other countries 
(World Bank 2015): 
(i) Lower transport costs 
(ii) Eliminate formal and informal barriers that undermine investments in regional 
processing activity 
(iii) Increase the effectivity of labor markets 
(iv) More effective competition policies 
 
3.1 Risks and possibilities in China-SSA FDI 
 
Africa is seen to be a risky place to make investments from the perspective of the rest 
of the world. China is different in the sense that it also makes lots of investments in 
countries with politically fragile environments. One crucial exogenous risk is a political 
risk, which many studies have found to be negatively correlated with FDI inflows, see for 
example Guerin and Manzocchi (2009). They find that democracy increases the amount 
and probability of FDI flows into emerging countries when compared to other regimes. 
It is commonly known that few countries in SSA have democracy as a regime.  
When talking about technologies, it is noticeable that Chinese firms use technologies 
that may suit very well for the countries in SSA. China itself has been a poor country only 
a few years ago, and it probably has many suitable intermediate or low-skill technologies 
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for SSA. Chinese production is going to concentrate more on higher skilled production 
(Song 2011) which most likely releases lots of low-skill production capacity from China 
to Africa in the following years. These investments could increase the technology 
frontier of Africa and SSA in different industries which again would attract more FDI from 
China. Too high-skilled technologies would not be suitable for a continent like Africa, 
because the overall human capital level is too low. This particular pattern is one key 
advantage for China to invest in SSA compared to other countries (Busse et al. 2014.)     
As noted earlier, natural resources has been one of the most important reasons for 
China to invest in SSA. Figure 3 shows a clear connection between investments in 
resource-rich countries and crude oil price. It is important that the resource-rich SSA 
countries do not rely their future economic development solely on FDI in natural 
resources but diversify their economic structures. Volatile prices of oil and natural gas 
for example make these countries more vulnerable compared to more diverse 
economies.  
Figure 3 also shows that the less resource-rich countries are increasing their share of all 
investments. This trend is also going on with the investments from China to SSA. Cheung 
et al. (2012) mention that the extent of natural resources in African countries rather 
determines the size of Chinese firms’ investment decision than the investment decision 
altogether. They also point out that a common phenomenon in Africa is that Chinese 
firms build infrastructure there by using the revenues coming from natural resources. 
Natural resources can thus be an important part of the whole pie of economic 
development, but other industries need to be developed to keep economic 
development more stable in the future.   
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Figure 3: Investment in African countries (Source: The Economist 2015) and Crude Oil 
Price (Source: Macrotrends)  
It is also important to notice that labor costs have increased a lot in recent years in China, 
and that’s why African low wage countries have become increasingly attractive for 
Chinese firms. The wages of Chinese workers have outpaced productivity growth, which 
has reduced the competitive advantage especially in manufacturing compared to SSA 
countries (Ceglowski et al. 2015). It is important to keep in mind though, that there are 
other important factors (institutions, infrastructure etc.) which affect the location of 
final production.     
 
Figure 4: Relative Unit Labor Costs relative to China (Source: Ceglowski et al. 2015) 
Figure 4 shows that Ethiopia and Tanzania are competitive with China when talking 
about relative unit labor costs. The relative unit labor costs in SSA countries related to 
China have decreased at a constant rate in the 2000s. Still, most of the SSA countries are 
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not competitive enough when compared to China. The future might of course change 
this relationship even more in favor of SSA, if the ongoing trend continues.        
Chinese networks in SSA are extremely important when talking about risk factors of 
investing abroad. Chinese private FDI firms have got really important help from the 
business networks of overseas Chinese (Song 2011). There has been three different 
generations of Chinese firms, which are presented in Figure 5. Now the newest 
generation of private Chinese firms can utilize these former networks. Chinese FDI 
private firms are relatively small, so for them it is beneficial to use these networks to 
survive against the local competition. Hayakawa et al. (2013) point out that the sunk 
costs of FDI include acquiring information of the host country in order to know how 
everything works there. One would assume that for example learning a local language 
is very important factor related to the sunk costs. These kind of special networks 
decrease the sunk costs, and without these networks Chinese firms might invest in other 
regions of the world.  
 
Figure 5: Networks of Overseas Chinese and Private Enterprises in Africa (Source: Song 
(2011)) 
 
 
3.2 Local labor and contracts with China 
 
One of the most important issues for SSA is that local labor is used in Chinese FDI 
projects. Additional jobs give the host country a boost for their economic development 
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in the future if local labor is used. It is thus expected that employment levels and 
technology transfers are going to increase, if these kind of policies are implemented. It 
is understandable that there might not be enough local knowledge to utilize the labor 
of the host country in the industries with complex technologies. Of course Chinese FDI 
firms might want to keep their technologies in secrecy to some extent. These spillover 
effects are discussed more in this chapter later.   
There are many examples where Chinese companies bring their own workers to the host 
country. For example Adisu et al. (2010) find this kind of pattern existing in Africa. On 
the other hand, Kamwanga and Koyi (2009) firstly mention that the hiring of local 
workers depends on how long a Chinese FDI firm has been in Africa. Secondly, they note 
that finding relevant and right type of labor might be a problem. This second point of 
course requires flexible and efficient labor markets in the host country. Relatively 
backward countries unfortunately do not have these kind of labor markets. This can lead 
to a bad situation where only Chinese labor is used instead of some local African labor. 
African governments can correct this issue by making laws or requirements where a 
proportion of labor in FDI projects has to be local (Asongu and Aminkeng 2013).  
Technology transfer from Chinese MNEs to African local firms is not of course 
guaranteed with the use of local labor, because technologies might not efficiently 
transfer from one party to another in the MNEs.  
In some ways it is quite understandable that Chinese FDI firms do not want to employ 
local labor. Gadzala’s (2010) article deals with the labor practices of Chinese FDI firms in 
Zambia. These labor practices also apply more generally in other African and SSA 
countries. She mentions few possible worrying issues related to local labor including the 
lack of appropriate skills and trust to local workers. The following quotation of an 
employee of the China National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Corporation 
nicely summarizes this whole story:  
“If my supervisor gives me a task to finish in two hours, I work hard to finish it in one. If I 
give an African a task to finish in a day and at the end of the day ask him if it is finished, 
the response often is ´Insha’Allah´ and the task remains unfinished”. (Personal 
communication, Beijing, September 2007).  
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Chinese FDI firms in Zambia violate many acts for example by paying salaries below 
minimum wages and laying off local workers before the end of their contracts (Gadzala 
2010). These practices are not uncommon in other developing countries in SSA, and 
that’s why they should be corrected. It is absolutely crucial that the governments in SSA 
make specific and strict policies related to Chinese FDI. Things like local content 
requirement and technology transfers are two important issues along many others. Of 
course there are differences between countries in SSA related to the development of 
these kind of policies. SSA countries differ in many ways, but the overall implementation 
level of these requirements and laws are still way too low in SSA.         
Technology transfer or spillovers from Chinese MNEs to local firms are important when 
talking about technological and economic development in SSA. The problem here is that 
Chinese and other FDI firms do not want to reveal their technologies easily because of 
valuable information. Blomström and Sjöholm (1999) mention that FDI firms might bring 
less advanced technologies with them or even refuse to invest because of this particular 
fact. They point out that many governments in developing countries have imposed 
restrictions that force MNEs to make joint venture agreements. Joint ventures are good 
for the developing economies from the perspective of technology diffusion, because the 
local partners probably learn better working in joint ventures than from the products of 
subsidiaries. A joint venture has also some benefits for MNEs; local partners probably 
have better knowledge of local markets and employees along with many other specific 
information. 
      
3.3 A case study of China-Nigeria FDI 
 
Countries in SSA are quite different when talking about their structure of economies but 
most of them have vast natural resources. One of them is Nigeria which is the biggest 
economy in Africa. This is one of the reasons I chose to take a closer look to Nigeria, but 
another reason is that there does not yet exist a lot of research material about other 
countries. This case of China-Nigeria FDI should still give a lot of important experiences 
and examples how to utilize a massive possibility of Chinese investments in the future. I 
am going to use three different main sources of articles to open up this case a little more. 
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Nigeria is a large country by a population over 180 million and with potentially large 
consumer markets in the future. China is investing in almost every country in SSA, but 
Nigeria is getting the biggest part of Chinese FDI (UNCTAD, 2009). China’s FDI in Nigeria 
is going to the oil and gas sector with the share of roughly 75% (Oyeranti et al. 2011), 
but China has increasingly expanded its presence in other sectors at the same time. One 
of the fastest growing sectors (related to foreign investments) outside the extractive 
industries is manufacturing (Nnanna 2015). This is a risk for Nigerian manufacturing 
firms, because they face stern competition from Chinese manufacturing MNEs. He also 
discusses the problem of worsening unemployment in Nigerian manufacturing sector. 
Chinese MNEs have for example better skills and infrastructure, so they are much more 
competitive than corresponding Nigerian firms. It is thus very important to make policies 
which ensure that FDI inflows are not by any means harmful for manufacturing or other 
industries. 
Let’s now turn the discussion to the attractiveness of Nigeria as a receiving country of 
FDI. How has Nigeria been able to increase its attractiveness when talking about FDI? 
First step was when Nigeria became a democracy in year 1999. This event made 
economic renewal possible. Before this event Nigeria was having decades of political 
instability, corruption and economic mismanagement which did not help the 
attractiveness of Nigeria related to possible FDI inflows. According to WTO (2005) there 
are three reasons why Chinese FDI flows have started to increase into Nigeria and they 
are 
1) Changes in FDI regime 
2) Privatization programme of the government 
3) Aggressive drive of the government in attracting FDI into the country 
These three points are common for every African country who wants to increase FDI 
inflows from other countries. Nnanna (2015) still points out that investing in Nigeria is 
very risky, although Nigerian government has implemented many important laws in 
terms of FDI inflows.    
There is a clear pattern of Chinese investments when talking about private firms vs. 
state-owned firms (SOFs). Majority of the investments in Nigeria are made by Chinese 
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SOFs, actually 84.25 per cent in year 2006 (Oyeranti et al. (2011)). Another usual way of 
Chinese firms doing FDI is by joint ventures. Joint venture is the best way to do FDI 
according to Oyeranti et al., because it potentially benefits the receiving country of FDI 
most. Technology and skills might be transferred easier to the host country from joint 
ventures compared to subsidiaries. Employment of Nigerian workers should 
theoretically be better in joint ventures especially if labor practices are not efficiently 
implemented in Chinese MNEs.           
What is common for many researches about Nigeria and Africa is that infrastructure is a 
big problem in many countries. Oyeranti et al. (2011) point out that China and Nigeria 
have economic complementarities: Nigeria needs a vast amount of infrastructure 
investments to build its investment climate, and China has really large construction 
industries with financial assistance to support this urgent need. For example China’s 
rapidly increasing manufacturing sector needs lots of raw materials which can be found 
in Nigeria. It is also important to notice that Chinese firms have to face a lot of different 
problems when operating in Nigeria. One good example is the case of Chinese National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) which made a deal in oil industry with a goal to refine 
110,000 barrels of oil per day. In the end CNPC was able to refine only 70% of this target 
due to the lack of maintenance (Oyeranti et al. 2011). This event just shows that there 
are lots of uncertainties and risks to invest in Nigeria.  
Free Trade Zones (FTZ) are a way to promote economic development in many different 
ways. China has been interested to develop these kind of zones in Nigeria. Nnanna 
(2015) mentions that China’s public and private firms want to connect the major cities 
with new roads, airports etc. Oyeranti et al. (2011) discuss many incentives these FTZs 
have for foreign investors including for example tax holidays and duty-free importation 
of raw materials. One of these zones is Lekki-FTZ (LFTZ) in Lagos, Nigeria which has many 
important missions related to improving the investment climate for Chinese investors. I 
think that out of the six missions mentioned in the article of (Oyeranti et al. (2011)) the 
two most important are  
 Attracting foreign investments and 
 Creating job opportunities  
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It is crucial to get Nigerian workers to work in Chinese MNEs. There has been a serious 
concern that Chinese firms would bring not only their own workers but complete 
products and technologies with them. This kind of inefficiency might have harmful 
effects for the economy of Nigeria. The basic idea for Nigeria is to transfer technologies 
and skills from China. Nigeria has to ensure that labor law, social responsibility law and 
local content requirement (human and physical) are in good shape in order to get the 
benefits out of the FDI cooperation with China. An encouraging example though is 
Huawei’s action to establish a training center in Nigeria. It is possible for 2,000 Nigerian 
telecoms engineers (per annum) to increase their skills and knowledge in this place. This 
should lead to a higher level of human capital and technology frontier and eventually 
make Nigeria more attractive FDI destination at least in the industry of 
telecommunication. (Oyeranti et al. 2011.)   
 
4 The model of risk and technology content of FDI 
 
Many firms with a high-tech product line have moved their production to developing 
countries but brought back the production to their home country. Why does this kind of 
development spring up? The model of Chang and Lu (2012) tries to open up this 
interesting feature by introducing a risk of FDI quality failure because of a technology 
gap between the North and South. They bring up an example of a Japanese firm Canon, 
where it decided to keep a large part of its production in Japan instead of producing in 
China. Canon is accustomed to make high quality products for example digital cameras 
and photocopiers. The model explains this so that the cheaper labor in China was not 
enough to compensate the loss coming from the risk of FDI quality failure in production, 
and the higher fixed costs in the South than North.    
 
4.1 Production technology and the risk of FDI quality failure 
 
Chang and Lu (2012) build a North-South model where they introduce the risk of FDI 
quality failure, and technology frontiers in the South. The lower the technology gap 
between the North and South, the more FDI the South attracts. There are two countries 
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in the model: the more advanced North and the developing South. Consumers in both 
countries have identical preferences, and the demand for good 𝑖 of industry 𝑗 is 
𝑥𝑗(𝑖) = 𝑝𝑗(𝑖)
−
1
1−𝛼, 0 < 𝛼 < 1                                              (1)  
where 𝑝𝑗(𝑖) is the price of variety 𝑖 of industry 𝑗, and 
1
1−𝛼
 is the price elasticity of demand 
for each variety of an industry. In the upcoming analysis 𝑥𝑗(𝑖) is denoted as 𝑥, because 
this simplifies presentation. The production follows the O-ring theory of Kremer (1993), 
so that a certain amount of steps 𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝜃] are needed to complete the production 
chain. This theory is discussed more in detail in subchapter 2.2. The amount of steps is 
a very important number, because it measures the complexity of the production 
technology. Higher 𝜃 implies more advanced technology and all the steps have to be 
completed successfully in order to sell the product in the markets: 
𝑥 = {
[∫ 𝜆(𝑠)𝜌𝑑𝑠
𝜃
0
]1/𝜌, in case of success;
              0,               in case of failure,
   0 < 𝜌 < 1,                   (2) 
where 𝜆(𝑠) is the intensity to complete step 𝑠, and 
1
1−𝜌
 is the elasticity of substitution 
between any two steps 𝑠.       
It is important to notice that labor is the only factor of production in the model and the 
wage rates are so that 𝑤𝑛 > 𝑤𝑠 (wages are higher in the North than in the South). The 
production cost is ∫ 𝑤𝑙𝜆(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝜃
0
 and it is tried to be minimized with a production 
technology 𝜃. The steps are symmetric so that 𝜆(𝑠) = 𝜆 = 𝑥𝜃−1/𝜌, ∀𝑠 ∈ [0, 𝜃]. 
Substituting 𝜆(𝑠) into the cost function we get the minimized unit production cost: 
𝑐𝑙(𝜃) = 𝑤𝑙𝜃
𝜌−1
𝑝 ,                                                 (3)     
where 
𝜕𝑐𝑙(𝜃)
𝜕𝑤𝑙
> 0 and 
𝜕𝑐𝑙(𝜃)
𝜕𝜃
< 0. The conduct of equation (3) is presented in Appendix 
B.  
→ Firms who relocate their production in the South, or who have a more advanced 
technology get a cost advantage compared to others 
→ The unit cost is paid even in the case of failure in production (all steps are not 
successfully completed) 
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The next two equations are very important, because they show the probability 𝛾𝑙(𝜃) to 
successfully complete all the steps in location 𝑙, when a firm has a technology 𝜃: 
𝛾𝑁(𝜃) ≜ 1,              ∀𝜃, where 1 ≤ 𝜃                                 (4) 
   𝛾𝑆(𝜃) =  {
        1,              if 1 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝑇𝑆  
 (
𝑇𝑆
𝜃
)
𝑧
,             if 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃
                            (5) 
where 𝑇𝑆 > 1 is the technology frontier or level of the South and 𝑧 is the degree of risk 
sensitivity, as Chang and Lu (2012) denote. They define 𝑧 as follows: “The risk sensitivity 
𝑧 reflects the elasticity of the success probability to the technology gap”. This risk 
parameter is opened up more in subchapter 5.2, where different risks of FDI are 
discussed more. 
We can make two basic conclusions from equations (4) and (5): Firstly, there exists no 
risk of FDI quality failure in the North and secondly, there exists a risk of FDI quality 
failure in the South, if there is a technology gap between the North and South so that 
𝜃 > 𝑇𝑠. The lack of proper skills and knowledge of southern workers increase the 
probability of FDI quality failure in southern production. They should be able to use 
technologies that the FDI firms bring with them either in advance or through some 
training of skills. The risk parameter 𝑧 finally defines how sensitively the changes in 
technology frontier in the South affect the final success probability 𝛾𝑆(𝜃).    
Firms also have to pay a fixed setup cost, and it is assumed to be higher in the South 
than in the North (𝑓𝑆 > 𝑓𝑁). The profit in country 𝑙 is then: 
max𝜋𝑙(𝜃) = 𝛾𝑙(𝜃)𝑥𝛼 − 𝑐𝑙(𝜃)𝑥 − 𝑤𝑁𝑓𝑙
𝑥                                                                 
,                             (6) 
and               𝑥𝑙(𝜃) = (
𝛼𝛾𝑙(𝜃)
𝑐𝑙(𝜃)
)
1
1−𝛼                                        (7) 
where the fixed costs 𝑓𝑙  are denominated in terms of northern labor. Equation (7) gives 
the optimal output level in country 𝑙. The conduct of equation (7) is presented in 
Appendix B. It is easy to see that a firm has higher output levels, if its unit cost of 
production decreases or the probability of succeeding in production increases. This is 
intuitively quite clear, what Chang and Lu (2012) present here. The optimal output levels 
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(8) and (9) for the North and South respectively are obtained by substituting Eq. (3), (4), 
and (5) into Eq. (7): 
 𝑥𝑁(𝜃) = Ω𝑁𝜃𝑣,       ∀𝜃, where 1 ≤ 𝜃                            (8) 
𝑥𝑆(𝜃) = {
  Ω𝑆𝜃𝑣 ,            if 1 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝑇𝑆
Ω𝑆 (
𝑇𝑆
𝜃
)
𝑧
1−𝛼
𝜃𝑣,   if 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃
                                 (9) 
where 𝑣 ≡ (
1−𝜌
𝜌
) (
1
1−𝛼
) > 0, and Ω𝑙 ≡ (
𝛼
𝑤𝑙
)
1
1−𝛼
 where Ω𝑁 < Ω𝑆. The conduct of 
equations (8) and (9) are presented in Appendix B. It is easy to see that better technology 
increases output of the firms if there exists no FDI risk. In the existence of FDI risk, firms 
do less FDI in the South and even more so if the technology gap is large. 
The expected profits in the North and South can simply be calculated by using Eq.(6) 
where the profit of a country 𝑙 is defined. With some basic substitutions the following 
profit functions for both countries are obtained: 
                          𝜋𝑁(𝜃) = 𝜓𝑁𝜃𝑣𝛼 − 𝑤𝑁𝑓𝑁 ,                       ∀𝜃,where 1 ≤ 𝜃                  (10) 
𝜋𝑆(𝜃; 𝑇𝑆, 𝑧) = {
  𝜓𝑆𝜃𝑣𝛼 − 𝑤𝑁𝑓𝑆,                    if 1 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝑇𝑆
𝜓𝑆 (
𝑇𝑆
𝜃
)
𝑧
1−𝛼
 𝜃𝑣𝛼 −𝑤𝑁𝑓𝑆,       if 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃
                  (11)   
where 𝜓𝑙 = (1 − 𝛼)(Ω𝑙)𝛼 with 𝜓𝑁 < 𝜓𝑆. Figure 6 in next subchapter 4.2 includes 
transformations of ?̃? = 𝜃𝜈𝛼 and ?̃?𝑆 ≡ (𝑇𝑆)𝜈𝛼 because of illustrative reasons.  
The trade-off in the South is between lower wages 𝑤𝑆 and higher risk of FDI quality 
failure 𝑧, or formally 
𝜕(𝜋𝑆−𝜋𝑁)
𝜕𝑤𝑆
< 0 and 
𝜕(𝜋𝑆−𝜋𝑁)
𝜕𝑧
< 0. This trade-off can be interpreted 
as a relative unit labor cost 𝑤𝑆/(1/𝑧) in the South. Here I of course assume that 1/𝑧 
measures productivity so that higher 𝑧 implies lower productivity and vice versa. Higher 
𝑧 could for example imply longer time of doing one step of a production by a worker. 
This would decrease productivity and the value of a product.  
Next chapter introduces the most important part of this analysis up to this point, and it 
is the FDI decision-making process of the northern firms. Four different combinations of 
𝑧 and 𝑇𝑆 are used to illustrate how the FDI flows might differ depending on these two 
parameters. The basic idea is to compare the expected profits in the North and South 
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and then decide whether a firm’s technology is suitable and profitable enough to move 
production to the South.   
4.2 FDI decision-making of the northern firms 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Expected profits of FDI and production in the North (Source: Chang and Lu 
(2012)) 
FDI FDI 
no FDI 
FDI 
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There are two profit-curves in Figure 6: the blue one ?̃?𝑆 reflects the profits in the South, 
and the green one ?̃?𝑁 reflects the profits in the North. A firm always wants to make FDI 
(or move production to the South), when the profit-curve of the South is above the 
North one. There exists no FDI risk in the North, so the profit-curve of the North is 
increasing to the technology level ?̃? in every case from (a) to (d). On the other hand, the 
profit-curve of the South is concave when there exists a risk of a FDI quality failure (𝑧 >
0). Depending on 𝑧 and the technology frontier in the South 𝑇𝑆, the profit-curve in the 
South changes its position in Figure 6.  
The risk-free case in Figure 6(a) is only a theoretical base for the analysis, because it is 
not possible to start a risk-free production in a developing country for a relatively high-
tech firm. The technology frontier cannot be that high in any case here. Figure 6 also 
reveals the following assumption which gives the relationship between 𝜃𝑁 and 𝜃𝑁𝑆: 
Assumption 1.  
𝜃𝑁 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆, where 𝜃𝑁 ≡ (
𝑤𝑁𝑓𝑁
𝜓𝑁
)
1
𝜈𝛼
, and 𝜃𝑁𝑆 ≡ (
𝑤𝑁(𝑓𝑆−𝑓𝑁)
𝜓𝑆−𝜓𝑁
)
1
𝜈𝛼
 
 
This Assumption 1 is usually assumed in the standard literature, and it ensures that some 
northern firms with relatively low technology stay and produce in the North because of 
too high fixed costs in the South. The worst-case scenario is of course seen in the case 
of (c), because the host country is able to attract no FDI. This result is based on the fact 
that the technology level is very low in the South, and at the same time the risk of FDI 
quality failure is high enough to prevent any FDI flows from the North. In the range of 
1 ≤ 𝑇𝑆 ≤ 𝜃𝑁𝑆,  𝑧
∗ depicts the threshold, so that all 𝑧 < 𝑧∗ would invite at least some 
firms in the North to do FDI.  
The two remaining figures [6(b) and 6(d)] represent the only realistic possibilities for FDI 
to flow from the North to South. In both of the cases there exists three different firms 
in the North: Firstly, some of the firms exit the markets. These firms have very low 
technology levels (𝜃 ∈ [1, 𝜃𝑁]), and they make negative profits. Secondly, another group 
of firms stay in the North and thus do not practice FDI (𝜃 ∈ [𝜃𝑁 , 𝜃0]) or 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃1, ∞)). 
This result is based on two facts:  
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1) Firms with very high technologies would have a large market share in the South, 
but the (very high) risk 𝑧 is too large, so the firms find it unprofitable to do FDI.  
2) On the other hand, firms with technologies 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃𝑁 , 𝜃0] understand that they 
would not have large enough market share in the South, even though their risk 
for FDI failure would be relatively small. Thus, they find it unprofitable to produce 
in the South. 
Thirdly, the rest of the firms 𝜃 ∈ [𝜃0, 𝜃1]) move their production to the South or in other 
words do FDI. This group of firms is the key for a host country to accelerate its economic 
development. This model thus finds that only firms with intermediate technology levels 
find it profitable to rather produce in the South than North.   
If it is expected that FDI flows improve the technological capacity of the South, as for 
example Matsuyama (2002) suggests, then the technology gap decreases between the 
South and North. This of course decreases the risk 𝑧, and more firms are willing to do 
FDI after this event. The following Proposition 1 and Figure 7 nicely summarize the whole 
analysis between 𝑧 and 𝑇𝑆 in a more precise way:  
 
Proposition 1. 
(i) For relatively low levels of technology frontiers 𝑇𝑆 ∈ [1, 𝜃𝑁𝑆] in the South, 
there exists a unique risk sensitivity ceiling 𝑧∗(𝑇𝑆), such that positive 
amounts of FDI take place if and only if 𝑧 < 𝑧∗(𝑇𝑆); for relatively high levels 
of technology frontiers 𝑇𝑆 ∈ (𝜃𝑁𝑆, ∞) in the South, FDI occurs regardless of 
risk sensitivity 𝑧.  
(ii) Alternatively, for any given degree of risk sensitivity 𝑧, there exists a unique 
threshold 𝑇𝑆
∗
(𝑧) for the technology frontier in the South, such that 𝑇𝑆
∗
(𝑧) 
weakly increases in 𝑧 and that positive amounts of FDI take place if and only 
if 𝑇𝑆 > 𝑇𝑆
∗
(𝑧).    
The proof of Proposition 1 is presented in Appendix A. 
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The following figure tries to demonstrate Proposition 1 in an intuitive fashion: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Threshold technology frontier for inward FDI (Author’s own version of Chang 
and Lu (2012)) 
 
Figure 7 shows that FDI is more likely to occur in situations where 𝑧 is low and 𝑇𝑆 is high. 
There exist a certain threshold level of technology 𝜃𝑁𝑆 in the South, and this ensures 
that FDI always takes place. The curve 𝐶𝐶′ demonstrates a situation, where the 
expected profits in the South and North are equal. It thus determines the decision of 
move or not to move production to the South.  
 
4.2.1 Machines in the North as substitutes for southern labor  
 
Machines and robots have started to become much cheaper in recent years. Machines 
in developed countries are starting to substitute cheap labor in particular industries of 
developing countries. The Economist (2016) evaluates that especially jobs in poorer 
countries are in danger of automatization. It is estimated that 69% of jobs in India, 77% 
in China and 85% in Ethiopia are threatened. Two main reasons for these estimates 
stand up from that article: Firstly, there are not plenty of jobs that are hard to automate. 
In other words, jobs in those countries usually require less skills and knowledge than in 
FDI FDI 
FDI 
no FDI 
no FDI 
𝑇𝑆 
𝜃𝑁𝑆 
𝐶′ 
𝑧 
𝑇𝑆
∗
(𝑧) 
0 
1 𝐶 
𝑧∗(1) 𝑧∗(𝜃𝑁𝑆) = 𝑧̅ 
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more developed countries. Secondly, the jobs in those countries are usually very labor 
intensive and not much capital is tied up in production.  
The risk for developing countries lies in the fact that developed countries might pull back 
their production due to this development. On the other hand, it is possible that they do 
not even start the production in developing countries. This was the case, when a Chinese 
firm PPC (which makes connectors to televisions) chose not to move production to 
Vietnam because of continually cheaper machines (one of the reasons). Especially 
industries with high elasticity of substitution between labor and capital 𝜎 =
{[
∆(𝐾 𝐿⁄ )
𝐾 𝐿⁄
] / [
∆(𝑤 𝑟⁄ )
𝑤 𝑟⁄
]} are in danger in the South related to FDI. The notations are so that 
𝐾 is capital, 𝐿 is labor, 𝑤 is the wage rate, and 𝑟 is the real interest rate.   
Even though the benchmark model has labor as its only factor of production, I think it 
would be very demonstrative to show how this recent pattern of cheaper machines 
would change the profit curves in the South and North. Thus I assume that machines are 
used instead of labor in the North, and 𝑤𝑁 is substituted with 𝑟 so that 𝑟 < 𝑤𝑁. 
Obviously it is important to remember that these machines need some labor to use 
them. To not make this too complicated, I assume that 𝑟 includes the cost of the 
workforce using machines in the North.     
These assumptions would imply increase in 𝜓𝑁𝜃𝑣𝛼 in the profit function of the North. 
This part of the profit function defines the slope of the northern profit curve. Another 
assumption I make is that machines are making no mistakes so that 𝑧 = 0. Thus, the 
change in the profit curve of the North is the following one: 
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Figure 8: The effect of cheaper machines in the North (Author’s own variation of Chang 
and Lu (2012)) 
where ?̃?𝑁
′
 is the new profit curve of the North, ?̃?𝑁𝑆
′  denotes the new cutoff level, ?̃?1′ 
denotes the new upper bound of FDI, 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑤
𝑁
 shows the amount of FDI with only labor 
used in the North, and 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑟 shows the amount of FDI with machines in the North 
substituting southern labor. The example in Figure 8 is the case of high technology 
frontier in the South, but it could be any combination of 𝑧 and 𝑇𝑆. The most important 
conclusion here is that cheaper machines in the North decrease the amount of FDI in 
both lower and upper bounds (𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑟 < 𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑤
𝑁
). It could also be the case that some 
industries might lose all the FDI flows, if machines are relatively much cheaper than 
southern labor. Especially northern firms with high technology might decrease their FDI 
flows quite a lot, and the existing high-tech FDI firms might pull back their production.       
 
 
 
?̃?𝑁
′
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑤
𝑁
 
𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑟 
 
𝜃𝑁𝑆
′  
𝜃1
′ 
0 ?̃? 
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4.3 Extensive and intensive margins of FDI 
 
Analysis in this subchapter is concentrating only on the case where the South meets the 
minimum threshold of technology level, and FDI is implemented. Let technology content 
of inward FDI be denoted by Θ𝑆 ≡ [𝜃0, 𝜃1]. The lower and upper bounds are defined as 
follows: 
𝜋𝑁(𝜃1) = 𝜋
𝑆(𝜃1; 𝑇
𝑆, 𝑧),                      with 𝜋𝜃
𝑁(𝜃1) > 𝜋𝜃
𝑆(𝜃1)                                          (12) 
𝜋𝑁(𝜃0) = 𝜋
𝑆(𝜃0; 𝑇
𝑆, 𝑧),                      with 𝜋𝜃
𝑁(𝜃0) < 𝜋𝜃
𝑆(𝜃0)                                          (13) 
where 𝜋𝜃
𝑙 ≡ 𝜕𝜋𝑙/𝜕𝜃 for 𝑙 ∈ {𝑁, 𝑆} 
An interesting question is how the lower and upper bounds (where ?̃?𝑁 = ?̃?𝑆) change 
when the technology frontier of the South 𝑇𝑆 changes. This is shown in the following 
Lemma 2: 
Lemma 2.  
The upper bound 𝜃1 of the technology content Ѳ
𝑆of inward FDI increases, while the lower 
bound 𝜃0 of the technology content Ѳ
𝑆of inward FDI decreases weakly, with the South’s 
technology frontier 𝑇𝑆: 
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑇𝑆
= [𝜋𝜃
𝑁(𝜃1) − 𝜋𝜃
𝑆(𝜃1)]
−1 𝜋
𝑇𝑆
𝑆 (𝜃1) > 0,                                                                          (14) 
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑇𝑆
= {
[𝜋𝜃
𝑁(𝜃0) − 𝜋𝜃
𝑆(𝜃0)]
−1 𝜋
𝑇𝑆
𝑆 (𝜃0) < 0       if 1 ≤ 𝑇
𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆
0,                                                            if 𝜃𝑁𝑆 ≤ 𝑇
𝑆
                                    (15)        
where 𝜋
𝑇𝑆
𝑆 ≡ 𝜕𝜋𝑆/𝜕𝑇𝑆. The proof of Lemma 2 is presented in Appendix A. 
Aggregate production function of the MNEs in the South is assumed to be 𝛸𝑆 ≡
𝜒(𝜃0, 𝜃1, 𝑇
𝑆) = ∫ 𝑥𝑆(𝜃)
𝜃1
𝜃0
𝑑𝐺(𝜃) in a given industry. 𝐺(𝜃) is a cumulative distributive 
function, which is assumed to have a Pareto distribution with shape 𝑘: 𝐺(𝜃) = 1 −
(1/𝜃)𝑘 for 𝜃 ≥ 1 with 𝑘 > 𝜈. The parameter 𝑘 tells the dispersion of firm productivity, 
where higher (lower) 𝑘 implies lower (higher) dispersion of firms related to productivity. 
Using equation (9), the aggregate production of the MNEs in a given industry in the 
South becomes 
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𝜒(𝜃0, 𝜃1, 𝑇
𝑆) =
{
 
 
 
 
 
Ω𝑆𝑘
𝑎
(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼 [(𝜃0)
−𝑎 − (𝜃1)
−𝑎],     if 1 ≤ 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆,
Ω𝑆𝑘
(𝑘−𝜈)
[(𝜃0)
−(𝑘−𝜈) − (𝑇𝑆)−(𝑘−𝜈)] +                             
Ω𝑆𝑘
𝑎
(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼[(𝑇𝑆)−𝑎 − (𝜃1)
−𝑎],          if 𝜃𝑁𝑆 ≤ 𝑇
𝑆
              (16)        
where 𝑎 ≡
𝑧
1−𝛼
+ 𝑘 − 𝜈 > 0 holds under the parameter restriction 𝑘 > 𝜈, and this leads 
to the fact that the aggregate output is well defined in all scenarios. The conduct of 
equation (16) is presented in Appendix B. Next, the effect of change in the technology 
frontier to the production of the MNEs in the South is defined by Proposition 3: 
Proposition 3.  
The aggregate production 𝛸𝑆of the multinationals in a given industry increases with the 
South’s technology frontier 𝑇𝑆: 
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
= (
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑇𝑆
+
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑇𝑆
+
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝑇𝑆
) ≡ Λ > 0                                                               (17)    
The proof of Proposition 3 is presented in Appendix A. 
      
4.4 Technology frontier evolution and the dynamics of FDI 
 
The evolution of the technology frontier in the South is constructed in this subchapter, 
and it is made endogenous in the article of Chang and Lu (2012). Some of the equations 
in the remaining subchapters are only presented in the working papers of Chang and Lu 
(2011 and 2010). They model this technology process by introducing a learning function 
of Matsuyama (2002). The South increases its technology frontier by accumulating 
production learned from MNEs. As mentioned earlier, the focus of this thesis is to look 
things from the perspective of the South and same is done with this model. The 
aggregate discounted production activities of the MNEs in the South at time 𝑡 is  
𝑄𝑡
𝑆 ≡ ∑ (
1
1+𝛿𝐷
)
𝑡−𝜏
𝛿𝐿
𝑡
𝜏=0 𝑋𝜏
𝑆                                              (18) 
where 𝛿𝐷 > 0 is the depreciation rate of the base of technology spillover, and 𝛿𝐿 > 0 is 
the learning speed of the South related to the absorbing capacity of products of MNEs. 
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In real life higher 𝛿𝐷 would mean a loss of knowledge because of retirement of workers 
for example. The second parameter 𝛿𝐿 can become larger if human capital of the South 
increases or IPR protection is weakened. A weaker IPR protection should imply a faster 
rate of technological spillover from the MNEs to the South. The weaker IPR would also 
imply higher imitation risk, which could decrease the rate of multinationalization of 
northern firms. Thus there would be a lot less technologies to imitate after these events. 
It is not thus straightforward how tight the IPR policies should be made. Imitation and 
its effects on multinationalization is discussed more in subchapter 5.1 later on in this 
thesis. Now that 𝑄𝑡
𝑆 is known, the basic function of the evolution of the technology 
frontier in the South can be presented, and it is assumed to be 
𝑇𝑡
𝑆 ≡ 𝑇0
𝑆 + Г(𝑄𝑡
𝑆), 𝑡 = 1, 2, …                                                                                                   (19) 
 
where Г(∙) is the mapping from 𝑄𝑡
𝑆 to the improvement in 𝑇𝑡
𝑆 with three important 
properties: Г(0) = 0, Г𝑄 ≡
𝑑Г
𝑑𝑄𝑆
> 0 and 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑄𝑆→∞Г(𝑄
𝑆) → ∞. Two important 
conclusions can be made from these properties: 
1) More activities by MNEs in the South increase technology frontier there 
2) More recent production activities by MNEs are more valuable for the South 
As earlier, I want to first show a figure which illustrates the dynamics of FDI: 
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Figure 9: Dynamics of FDI (Source: Chang and Lu 2010) 
 
It is assumed that there is no FDI at the beginning (𝑄0
𝑆 = 0). Initial technology frontier 
in the South is here 𝑇0
𝑆 ∈ [1, 𝜃𝑁𝑆], and 𝑇
𝑆 = 𝑇𝑡−1
𝑆 . In this case the risk parameter 𝑧 has 
to be low enough [𝑧 < 𝑧∗(𝑇0
𝑆)] in order to the first wave of FDI to take place. This allows 
the South to start a technology catch-up process. Thus in period 𝑡 = 2, the technology 
frontier is higher (𝑇1
𝑆 > 𝑇0
𝑆), because the risk of FDI quality failure 𝑧 is now lower. Lower 
𝑧 strictly implies higher profits for all firms with 𝜃 > 𝑇0
𝑆. That leads to a second wave of 
FDI with wider range of northern firms at both the extensive and intensive margins.  
 
4.5 Steady state  
 
That kind of a mechanism in the previous subchapter is called a self-reinforcing 
agglomeration process, which makes this technology transfer very useful for the South. 
In the steady state we have 𝑄𝑆 = 𝛿𝑋𝑆, where 𝛿 (≡ 1 + 1/𝛿𝐷)𝛿𝐿 is the depreciation rate 
of the base of technology spillover. When 𝑄𝑆 = 𝛿𝑋𝑆 is substituted into Eq. (19), and Eq. 
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(12) and (13) into Eq. (16), the steady state of the dynamic system is obtained (two 
simultaneous equations): 
𝑇𝑆 = 𝑇0
𝑆 + Г(𝛿𝑋𝑆)                                                                                                                  (20) 
𝑋𝑆 = χ(𝜃0(𝑇
𝑆), 𝜃1(𝑇
𝑆), 𝑇𝑆)                                                                                                   (21) 
 
Figure 10(a) and the curves 𝐿𝐿 (learning) and 𝑃𝑃 (production) below show the 
relationship between 𝑋𝑆 and 𝑇𝑆, where 𝐿𝐿 illustrates Eq. (20) and 𝑃𝑃 illustrates Eq. (21). 
The following equations (22) and (23) are the aggregate production levels of the MNEs 
at 𝑇𝑆 = 𝑇0
𝑆 and at 𝑇𝑆 → ∞, respectively: 
𝑋𝑆 ≡ 𝜒(𝜃0(𝑇0
𝑆), 𝜃1(𝑇0
𝑆), 𝑇0
𝑆) > 0                                       (22) 
?̅?𝑆 ≡ ∫ Ω𝑆𝜃𝜈𝑑𝐺(𝜃) =
∞
𝜃𝑁𝑆
Ω𝑆𝑘
(𝑘−𝜈)
(𝜃𝑁𝑆)
−(𝑘−𝜈)                               (23) 
𝑋𝑆 > 0, because the assumption is that a positive amount of FDI is done at the 
beginning. When talking about ?̅?𝑆, it is only possible in the case of risk-free FDI (𝑇𝑆 →
∞). From Proposition 3 it is known that 𝑋𝑆 increases in 𝑇𝑆 at a rate Λ > 0.   
𝐿𝐿 curve has a characteristic that the level of technology frontier in the South would 
stay at its initial level if no FDI took place. The two other properties of the 𝐿𝐿 curve can 
be deduced straightforwardly and are presented below. All these properties of 𝑃𝑃 and 
𝐿𝐿 curves are summarized below:  
𝑃𝑃 (production) curve has the following properties: 
i. 𝑃𝑃 reaches the lower bound 𝑋𝑆 > 0 at 𝑇𝑆 = 𝑇0
𝑆 
ii. 𝑃𝑃 increases in 𝑇𝑆 at rate Λ > 0 
iii. 𝑃𝑃 approaches the maximum level of FDI ?̅?𝑆 as 𝑇𝑆 goes to infinity 
𝐿𝐿 (learning) curve has the following properties:       
i. 𝐿𝐿 goes through the point where the 𝑋𝑆 = 0 (no FDI) and 𝑇𝑆 = 𝑇0
𝑆  
ii. 𝐿𝐿 increases in 𝑋𝑆 at rate 𝛿Г𝑄 
iii. 𝐿𝐿 reaches the upper bound ?̅?𝑆 ≡ 𝑇0
𝑆 + Г(𝛿?̅?𝑆) if all firms above the cutoff level 
𝜃𝑁𝑆 were to undertake FDI as in the risk-free case 
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Figure 10(a): Existence of steady state (Source: Chang and Lu (2010)) 
 
 
Figure 10(b): Stability of steady state (Source: Chang and Lu (2010)) 
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These properties ensure the fact that the two curves have to cross each other at least 
once. Thus, there has to exist at least one steady state. Figure 10(a) illustrates the case 
of only one steady state, and Figure 10(b) tries to demonstrate the case of multiple 
steady states. In Figure 10(a) the curves cross only once, and it can be seen that the 
steady state is stable there. On the other hand, there can be stable and unstable steady 
states in the case of multiple equilibria [Figure 10(b)]. The lowest stable steady state is 
usually called a development trap, which is the steady state if starting with the initial 
technology frontier 𝑇0
𝑆. FDI inflows are on relatively low levels (as is the technology 
frontier 𝑇𝑆) in the development trap. A government of a developing country can have a 
huge effect in this kind of bad steady state situation towards the higher steady state. 
Different government policies are discussed intuitively and analytically in greater detail 
in the next subchapter. It is now important to analyze the stable steady states, and the 
following stability property comes from the following Lemma 4:  
Lemma 4.  
At a stable steady state, the following property holds, 
𝛿Г𝑄Λ < 1                                                            (24) 
 
The proof of Lemma 4 is presented in Appendix A. An increase to the technology frontier 
in the South 𝑇𝑆 leads to an increase in the multinational production 𝑋𝑆 by a rate Λ. This 
higher 𝑋𝑆 again increases 𝑇𝑆 by a rate 𝛿Г𝑄 . Thus, these two sequential effects lead to a 
total effect of 𝛿Г𝑄Λ. This total effect has to be below one in order an economy to be in 
a stable steady state. Otherwise the economy would not be in a stable steady state, and 
this is not what the interest here is. Now it is time to turn the focus on analyzing these 
stable steady states by using comparative statics with various policy parameters. The 
main motivation in the next subchapter is to try to find a way to get a developing country 
out of the development trap to the higher stable steady state.      
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4.6 Comparative static analysis and government policies  
 
This subchapter utilizes the analysis made in Chang and Lu (2010). In this subchapter 𝑞 
denotes one of the exogenous parameters which are discussed in the earlier part of the 
thesis (𝑇0
𝑆, 𝛿𝐷 , 𝛿𝐿 , 𝑤
𝑆, 𝑓𝑆, 𝑧, 𝜌). If we now take the total differentiation of (21) with 
respect to 𝑋𝑆, 𝑇𝑆 and 𝑞; we have  
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑞
= Ξ + Λ
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑞
                                                     (25) 
 
where Ξ ≡ (
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑞
+
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑞
+
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝑞
). The conduct of equation (25) is presented in 
Appendix B. The first two terms of Ξ are the extensive-margin effect, and the third term 
is the intensive-margin effect of 𝑞 on the aggregate production 𝑋𝑆. From earlier it is 
known that Λ =
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
> 0. It is also important to notice that the parameter 𝑞 also affects 
𝑋𝑆 indirectly: Changes in 𝑞 affect 𝑇𝑆, and changes in 𝑇𝑆 again affect 𝑋𝑆. Next we take 
the total differentiation of (20) with respect to 𝑋𝑆 , 𝑇𝑆 and 𝑞. After substituting 
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑞
 in 
equation (25) into that expression; we obtain 
 
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑞
= Σ−1𝛿Г𝑄Ξ + Σ
−1𝑋𝑆Г𝑄
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝑞
+ Σ−1
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆
𝜕𝑞
                                 (26) 
 
where Σ ≡ 1 − 𝛿Г𝑄Λ. The conduct of equation (26) is presented in Appendix B. There 
are thus three different ways how a change in 𝑞 can affect the technological frontier in 
the South: 
 
1) The first term (Σ−1𝛿Г𝑄Ξ): When 𝑞 = {𝑤
𝑆, 𝑓𝑆, 𝑧, 𝜌}, a change in one of those 
parameters has a direct effect Ξ on 𝑋𝑆, which again affects 𝑇𝑆 by a rate 𝛿Г𝑄. 
Positive reinforcing feature also generates a multiple Σ−1 of the initial effect 
on 𝑇𝑆.  
2) The second term (Σ−1𝑋𝑆Г𝑄
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝑞
): When 𝑞 = {𝛿𝐷 , 𝛿𝐿}, these parameters have 
a direct effect on the base of spillover 𝑄𝑆 through 𝛿. The technology frontier 
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is then affected by a rate 𝑋𝑆Г𝑄. Another multiplier effect Σ
−1 on the 
technology frontier is also generated. 
3) The third term (Σ−1
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆
𝜕𝑞
): When 𝑞 = 𝑇0
𝑆, it affects the steady-state 𝑇𝑆 
directly through 𝑇𝑆 = 𝑇0
𝑆 + Г(𝛿𝑋𝑆). 
 
Those different parameters of 𝑞 affect 𝑇𝑆 only through one specific channel mentioned 
above. For example 𝑤𝑆 affects only through channel 1) and 𝛿𝐷 only through channel 2) 
etc. Changes in the steady-state technology content of inward FDI can also be 
characterized with changes in lower and upper bounds. Let’s take the total 
differentiation of (12) and (13): 
𝑑𝜃1
𝑑𝑞
=
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑞
+
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑞
,                                                                        (27) 
𝑑𝜃0
𝑑𝑞
= {
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑞
+
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑞
,           if 1 ≤  𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑞
,                              if 𝜃𝑁𝑆  ≤  𝑇
𝑆         
                      (28) 
 
The equations (27) and (28) show that an exogenous parameter 𝑞 can directly affect 
upper and lower bounds of FDI inflows, if 𝑞 appears in the profit functions. Upper and 
lower bounds can also be affected indirectly through the change in the equilibrium 
technology frontier following a change in 𝑞.   
 
Many developing countries are trapped in a bad steady state as mentioned earlier, and 
there is a place for government intervention. This kind of intervention could shift the 𝐿𝐿 
or 𝑃𝑃 curves so that a country jumps toward a higher stable steady state. The following 
proposition shows analytically how changes in crucial parameters could help countries 
to jump toward a higher steady state FDI flows:   
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Proposition 5. 
The effects of general FDI promoting policies: 
(i) 
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇0
𝑆 > 0,
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑇0
𝑆 > 0,
𝑑𝜃1
𝑑𝑇0
𝑆 > 0,
𝑑𝜃0
𝑑𝑇0
𝑆 ≤ 0  with equality when θNS ≤ T
S;  
(ii) 
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝛿𝐷
< 0,
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝛿𝐷
< 0,
𝑑𝜃1
𝑑𝛿𝐷
< 0,
𝑑𝜃0
𝑑𝛿𝐷
≥ 0 with equality when θNS ≤ T
S;   
(iii) 
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝛿𝐿
> 0,
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝛿𝐿
> 0,
𝑑𝜃1
𝑑𝛿𝐿
> 0,
𝑑𝜃0
𝑑𝛿𝐿
≤ 0 with equality when θNS ≤ T
S; 
(iv) 
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑤𝑆
< 0,
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑤𝑆
< 0,
𝑑𝜃1
𝑑𝑤𝑆
< 0,
𝑑𝜃0
𝑑𝑤𝑆
> 0; 
(v) 
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑓𝑆
< 0,
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑓𝑆
< 0,
𝑑𝜃1
𝑑𝑓𝑆
< 0,
𝑑𝜃0
𝑑𝑓𝑆
> 0. 
 
The proof of Proposition 5 is presented in Appendix A. Let’s first start the discussion with 
the initial technology frontier 𝑇0
𝑆. Proposition 5 shows that higher 𝑇0
𝑆 increases the mass 
of multinational production at both the extensive and intensive margins. Chang and Lu 
(2010) point out that a country’s advantage in 𝑇0
𝑆 compared to others is persistent and 
thus a very important parameter here. One example of a raise to 𝑇0
𝑆 could be a policy 
directing resources in infrastructure investment. Better infrastructure attracts more 
direct investments by MNEs and thus leads to higher 𝑇0
𝑆. This decreases the risk of FDI 
quality failure and leads to even more production by MNEs. The following figure 11(a) 
below shows the movement away from the old steady state 𝐼 to the new higher steady 
state 𝐼′ in the case of a unique equilibrium:  
  
Figure 11(a): Comparative statics with 𝑇0
𝑆 and 𝑇0
𝑆′  (Source: Chang and Lu (2010)) 
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From earlier it is known that 𝑄𝑡
𝑆 constitutes the base of technology spillover, and it 
depreciates at a rate 𝛿𝐷 > 0.  Lower 𝛿𝐷 thus means that the South can better utilize the 
knowledge from MNEs. For example better on-the-job training (OTJ) or education 
system could lead to a higher human capital rate, which makes a development jump 
possible from 𝐼 to 𝐼′ in the multiple steady state scenario. On the other hand, higher 𝛿𝐿 
is also very desirable, because higher learning speed increases the efficiency or 
absorptive capacity of FDI. Figure 11(b) below illustrates the increasing change in 
parameter 𝛿:      
 
Figure 11(b): Comparative statics with 𝛿 and 𝛿′ (Source: Chang and Lu (2010)) 
Lastly we have 𝑤𝑆, 𝑓𝑆, 𝑧 and 𝜌 in closer review. The results are quite intuitive and are 
seen in Propositions 5 and 6. Lower southern wages or fixed costs always increase the 
technological frontier in the South and the aggregate production by MNEs. FDI flows 
increase both at the extensive and intensive margins with lower 𝑤𝑆, but lower fixed 
costs attract more FDI by MNEs only at the extensive margin. The intensive margin effect 
of 𝑤𝑆 can be seen from Eq. (9). From the policy perspective, a FDI subsidy by a southern 
government could decrease 𝑤𝑆 or 𝑓𝑆 and thus lead to a higher steady state situation in 
a multiple steady state case. These two parameters and their effects on FDI inflows are 
illustrated with the following Figures 11(c) and 11(d):  
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Figure 11(c): Comparative statics with 𝑤𝑆
′
, 𝑤𝑆, 𝑧′, 𝑧, 𝜌′ and 𝜌 (Source: Chang and Lu 
(2010)) 
 
 
Figure 11(d): Comparative statics with 𝑓𝑆
′
 and 𝑓𝑆 (Source: Chang and Lu (2010)) 
Then we have the risk parameter 𝑧 and the technology parameter 𝜌, and the effects of 
these parameters can be interpreted by using the following Proposition 6: 
Proposition 6. 
Risk-sensitivity and industry-targeted FDI policies: 
(i) 
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑧
< 0,
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑧
< 0,
𝑑𝜃1
𝑑𝑧
< 0,
𝑑𝜃0
𝑑𝑧
≥ 0   with equality when 𝜃𝑁𝑆 ≤ 𝑇
𝑆 
(ii) 
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝜌
< 0,
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝜌
< 0,
𝑑𝜃1
𝑑𝜌
< 0,
𝑑𝜃0
𝑑𝜌
> 0     
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The proof of Proposition 6 is presented in Appendix A. Lower industry-specific 𝑧 
increases the technological frontier 𝑇𝑆, and also the production by MNEs at both the 
extensive and intensive margins. Higher 𝑇𝑆, on the other hand, decreases the risk 
sensitivity 𝑧. This kind of agglomeration process increases FDI inflows even more. Figures 
11(c) and 11(d) also show that changes in 𝑧 has similar effects as a lower 𝑤𝑆, 𝑓𝑆 or 𝜌. 
The most important point this Proposition 6 tries to say is that the technological catch-
up process may vary across industries, and thus FDI flows are probably also different 
across industries. Thus, an identical FDI-promoting policy for all different industries in 
an economy might be inefficient. A government of a developing country should 
definitely think about the proper targets of FDI policies to keep its FDI policy efficient. 
The technology parameter 𝜌 specifies the elasticity of substitution 
1
1−𝜌
 between 
intermediate steps of production. This parameter occurs in the cost function 𝑐𝑙(𝜃) =
𝑤𝑙𝜃
𝜌−1
𝑝 , and it can be seen that higher 𝜌 (the steps are more substitutable) increases 
costs for a FDI firm. This fact implies lower profits in the South. Higher 𝜌 will have 
harmful effects for the marginal FDI firms (not yet moved production to the South) at 
the upper and lower bounds of FDI as the range of FDI firms will narrow. In addition to 
this extensive effect, an intensive effect will also occur. Firms already producing in the 
South will decrease their output because of higher 𝜌. All this leads to a lower 
multinational production and eventually lower technological frontier in the South. 
Figure 11(c) shows how lower 𝜌 affects the economy in the South.      
 
4.7 Predictions and a comparison with actual data 
 
The theory of Chang and Lu (2012) leads to two major predictions:  
1) Only firms with intermediate productivity levels (or intermediate technology 
levels) in the North will do FDI entry in relatively backward southern countries   
2) Higher number of MNEs in the South decrease the risk sensitivity level, and the 
productivity spectrum of the intermediate firms doing FDI gets wider  
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The first prediction is quite an interesting one, because earlier theoretical literature, for 
example Helpman et al. (2004), has assumed that there is no risk of FDI failure. This leads 
to a prediction that firms with high technology levels do FDI. As we have learned, this is 
not the case at least in the big picture. In their model firms with intermediate technology 
levels choose foreign outsourcing instead of FDI. I am going to go through some earlier 
papers where empirical tests are made to test if the theory of Chang and Lu (2012) does 
really hold true.  
Firstly I want to introduce a paper of Kimura and Kiyota (2006), where they make 
research on exports and FDI outflows of Japanese firms. Their data is a firm-level 
longitudinal panel data for Japan between 1994 and 2000. The most important finding 
in the context of this chapter is that the firms with medium productivity levels either 
export or do FDI. On the other hand, the least productive firms neither export nor do 
FDI whereas the high productive firms both export and do FDI. There is some 
controversy in these results with the theory of interest. One of the problems might be 
the fact that the dataset includes FDI to not only developing countries but developed 
countries also.  
Another paper of Tomiura (2007) studies how productivity varies with different modes 
of globalization (outsourcing, exports and FDI). The data of this study includes all 
manufacturing industries in Japan, so this study is concentrated on the certain area of 
firms. I am interested to find what kind of productivity levels FDI firms have, so I 
concentrate on these particular firms. This study has also the same problem as Kimura 
and Kiyota (2006) related to the receiving firms of FDI. It would be optimal if the data 
had only FDI inflows to developing countries, but this data includes firms from all over 
the world.  
The distribution of productivity can be seen in Figure 12 where O, X, I, and Dom are 
abbreviations of outsourcing, exports, FDI, and domestic firms, respectively. The scale 
of productivity is divided in 18 different intervals. It is easy to see that FDI firms are the 
most productive firms of all firms. Still they are not strikingly above the average level of 
the productivity spectrum. If the risk factor of Chang and Lu (2012) was included in this 
Figure 12 with taking all the less risky FDI flows away, the result could very well be in 
line with this theory. The higher productivity FDI firms should then decrease a lot, and 
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the firms with intermediate technologies should be the majority. Here it is of course 
assumed that higher productivity implies higher technology which theoretically should 
be the case in the long-run.                  
 
Figure 12: Productivity levels of outsourcing, exporting, FDI and domestic firms (Source: 
Tomiura (2007)) 
All in all the data is really scarce when talking about the technology levels of firms doing 
FDI from a developed to a developing country. It is however possible to make some 
conclusions about the connection between theory and empirics. Actually the empirical 
research of Chang and Lu (2012) might be the best in the context of this interest. Their 
finding of US-China and Taiwan-China data of FDI flows supports the theory of their own. 
Anyway, this is really an interesting topic to discuss in the future. More empirical 
research has to be done in order to get more supportive results in terms of this 
interesting theory.  
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4.8 Problems and possible extensions of the model 
 
Every model has its own problems and this model is no different than any other models 
related to these issues. The core of the theory is the risk parameter 𝑧 which has its own 
simplifications. The magnitude of this parameter is not opened very well in this study. It 
is assumed that 𝑧 ≥ 0 with no upper limit, and thus it is hard to interpret the realistic 
numbers of the risk parameter. It is also very simplistic way to include risk into a profit 
function which of course have good and bad sides to it.        
Another worrying issue is the riskiness of labor force related to skills and knowledge. It 
can be seen that the profit functions are such that only local labor is expected to be used 
in the South. The idea is to utilize lower unit labor costs of southern workers. Empirical 
findings do not support this theory very well; in fact there are lots of cases where FDI 
firms use their own labor instead of local labor. These issues are presented more 
specifically in the subchapter 3.2. If a foreign firm uses its own labor force, it can be 
interpreted that there are no risks related to the technology content of managing the 
production successfully. The costs are of course also higher when using northern labor. 
The model is not able to take this into account.  
To sum it up, this model is quite simple, but it does not necessarily make this model bad. 
Simpler models are usually able to present the main idea nicely, but they might lack 
some important features. This model can be expanded in many directions, if one wants 
to do deeper analysis with it. Chang and Lu (2012) bring up some suggestions; it is for 
example possible to allow the risk parameter to evolve over time. Then it is also possible 
to include multiple production stages in many different countries.  Another interesting 
possibility would be to allow FDI firms to change their products or blueprints more in 
line with the technology frontier in the South. This would surely change the aggregate 
productivity of a certain industry. These extensions would make the model much more 
complicated, and they would not help me in any way with my particular interest of 
research. On the other hand, I will introduce the risk of southern imitation with southern 
innovation in the next chapter in order to broaden this study. I will also show how 
technology-neutral risks may hinder the decision of northern firms to do FDI.    
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5 Southern imitation with innovation and the risks of FDI 
 
The model of Chang and Lu (2012) introduces only an exogenous risk parameter 𝑧, but 
in this chapter I will also introduce an imitation parameter of southern firms 𝑖 which 
comes from the model of He and Maskus (2012). Their model is also a North-South 
model with labor as only factor of production. They find that initially high but decreasing 
imitation levels in the South might actually decrease multinationalization at the 
beginning of the development which is very interesting. This finding is based on a 
simulation of their model, and they get a result of a U-shaped curve between imitation 
and multinationalization rate. This can only happen though, if the South has an 
innovative R&D sector. There are two offsetting effects which affect the final outcome 
of FDI: 
1) Southern labor allocated to innovation (direct negative effect on FDI) 
2) Competition effect (positive effect on FDI) 
The first effect refers to the fact that some potential labor for MNEs are allocated to 
southern innovation processes. This decreases the labor supply for MNEs and they find 
moving production to the South less profitable compared to the possibility of no 
southern innovation. The second effect is opposite compared to the first one. The 
competition effect takes away profits from the existing northern firms, because new 
southern varieties have lower prices compared to the northern ones. This makes 
northern firms to become MNEs in order to utilize lower production costs in the South.  
 
         Figure 13: U-shaped curves of the innovative South (Source: Author’s own 
variation of He and Maskus (2012)) 
𝑖∗ 𝑖∗∗ 
 
𝑖 
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There are actually two U-shaped curves depending on the spillover rate 𝜆. This spillover 
rate is a reverse spillover rate which tells how easily knowledge flows to the North. The 
North is assumed to absorb knowledge from the South in addition to its own knowledge 
and learning-by-doing (LBD). Thus, higher 𝜆 implies lower unit labor cost for northern 
innovation. We can see from Figure 13 that a relatively high spillover level (𝜆 = 2/3) 
makes the U-shape curve to bend upwards at lower imitation rates than without 
spillovers (𝜆 = 0).    
 
5.1 Imitation parameter 𝑖 
 
This relatively unexpected feature of southern imitation 𝑖 (with southern innovation) 
can now be combined with the exogenous risk parameter 𝑧. I am not going to include 
this imitation parameter of 𝑖 into the southern profit function when 1 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝑇𝑆, 
because there is assumed to be no risk of imitation in this case. I also assume that 
imitation or IPR levels within industries may differ like the risk parameter 𝑧, which is a 
reasonable and realistic assumption. For example a pharmaceutical industry have to put 
massive amounts of money creating drugs for people. It is thus logical that this particular 
industry needs a very strong IPR protection against imitation. This kind of industry is 
much more sensitive to IPR protection than some other industries are. These previous 
properties ensures that the imitation parameter 𝑖 behaves similarly with the risk 
parameter 𝑧. Thus, the following profit functions are exactly similar to the profit 
functions in the paper of Chang and Lu (2012) except that the overall risk is now 𝑧 + 𝑖 
instead of 𝑧. The expected profits in the North and the South are now 
 
𝜋𝑁(𝜃) = 𝜓𝑁𝜃𝑣𝛼 − 𝑤𝑁𝑓𝑁 ,                       ∀𝜃,where 1 ≤ 𝜃 
𝜋𝑆(𝜃; 𝑇𝑆, 𝑧) = {
  𝜓𝑆𝜃𝑣𝛼 − 𝑤𝑁𝑓𝑆,                    if 1 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝑇𝑆
𝜓𝑆 (
𝑇𝑆
𝜃
)
𝑧+𝑖
1−𝛼
 𝜃𝑣𝛼 − 𝑤𝑁𝑓𝑆,       if 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃
 
where 𝑖 ≥ 0 is the imitation of the southern firms with the properties of   
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{
 
 
 
 𝑑(𝜋
𝑆 − 𝜋𝑁)
𝑑𝑖
< 0   if 0 < 𝑖 < 𝑖∗
𝑑(𝜋𝑆 − 𝜋𝑁)
𝑑𝑖
≥ 0   if 𝑖∗ ≤ 𝑖        
     with high degree of spillovers and southern R&D 
{
 
 
 
 𝑑(𝜋
𝑆 − 𝜋𝑁)
𝑑𝑖
< 0   if 0 < 𝑖 < 𝑖∗∗
𝑑(𝜋𝑆 − 𝜋𝑁)
𝑑𝑖
≥ 0   if 𝑖∗∗ ≤ 𝑖        
   without spillovers and with southern R&D 
where 𝑖∗ and 𝑖∗∗ divide the low and high levels of imitation with their respective levels 
of spillovers in the innovative South. Those two particular levels of imitation 𝑖∗  and 𝑖∗∗ 
are just illustrating the features of the model of He and Maskus (2012).  
The interpretation of these two properties is that for example increasing (initially) high 
imitation levels increase the profits more in the South than in the North. Southern 
innovation expands the variety of southern products and increases competition for 
more expensive northern varieties. The market share and profits of northern firms 
would go down, and that’s why they would like to become MNEs to utilize lower unit 
labor costs. Northern R&D sector can innovate even more varieties in the case of high 
degree of spillovers, because the North can now utilize information and technology from 
southern products. This increases multinationalization because northern firms want to 
again utilize the lower unit labor costs in the South. Figure 13 shows this mechanism, 
and it can be seen that the curve with high degree of spillovers is bending much faster 
than the other U-shaped curve. 
The basic literature assumes that higher imitation or weaker IPR always implies lower 
FDI flows to the host countries. He and Maskus (2012) find a U-shaped curve between 
these two which contradicts the standard literature. This interesting feature of imitation 
was plugged into the main model of Chang and Lu (2012) in this subchapter. Next I am 
going to open up the content of the risk parameter 𝑧 a little more. Additionally some of 
the technology-neutral risks of FDI are analyzed and plugged into the main model. It is 
known that FDI firms with technology 1 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝑇𝑆 do not have risks related to 
technology in the South, but these firms might have another type of risks in the South.   
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5.2 Risk parameter 𝑧 and technology-neutral country risks 𝑟 
 
Chang and Lu (2012) do not open up the content of the risk parameter 𝑧 very much in 
their own article, but they basically talk about the risk of FDI quality failure in a more 
general level. On the other hand, the article of Chang and Lu (2009) define the 
evolvement of 𝑧 in the following way: 
𝑧𝑡 =
1
𝐾 + 𝑇𝑡−1
 , 𝐾 ≥ 0, 𝑡 = 1,2, … 
 
where the parameter 𝐾 is the level of infrastructure in the South, which is same in all 
industries.  𝑇𝑡−1 is the accumulated knowledge diffused from the North to the South in 
period 𝑡 − 1. The most important variables in 𝐾 include physical infrastructure, social 
capital, human capital, and governance infrastructure. Infrastructure is an important 
factor here, because it can affect the threshold level of 𝑧∗ with a given technology level.  
The model of Chang and Lu (2012) has only the risk related to the technology gap 
between the North and the South. Even if the technology level of the South exceeds the 
level of a firm doing FDI, the production may not be completed if some outside risks 
come to negatively affect the production process. The most usual risk in the newer 
literature of FDI is a political risk which might adversely affect FDI flows. Other kind of 
risks include for example environmental catastrophes for all technological levels of FDI 
firms. These different risks are discussed in the following few sections.  
The risk parameter 𝑧 is connected to the technology gap between the North and the 
South which affects the final success probability of production, but there are other kind 
of risks that might have effects on every FDI firm regardless of their level of technology. 
These risks straightforwardly decrease the expected profits of all the FDI firms wanting 
to produce in the South. Hayakawa et al. (2013) describe these kind of risks as country 
risks which include different form of political and financial risks. They also point out that 
political risk increases the risk that the profits of a FDI firm might be negatively affected. 
FDI firms have high sunk (fixed) costs, so the future variable profits are extremely 
important for them. Another type of risk could be a risk of expropriation which is 
discussed more in this subchapter later.  
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Next I want to modify the profit functions of the previous subchapter 5.1 so that I add a 
parameter of 𝑟 to illustrate the technology-neutral risks for a FDI firm. These risks might 
affect FDI firms regardless of their technology levels. The parameter  𝑟 can be 
interpreted as a discount rate of the profits in the South, so that it decreases the 
expected profits or the value of a FDI firm. The parameter 𝑟 is here some exogenous 
cost for a FDI firm, for example a risk of decrease in the future returns to investment 
because of expropriation risk in the South. The parameter 𝑟 can also include risks of a 
war or a currency instability in addition to the risks of poor institutional quality or 
political instability. The difficulty for a firm is obviously to estimate the magnitude of 
these kind of risks when making a decision to move or not to move production to the 
South.     
 
The expected profits in the North and the South are now 
𝜋𝑁(𝜃) = 𝜓𝑁𝜃𝑣𝛼 − 𝑤𝑁𝑓𝑁 ,                       ∀𝜃,where 1 ≤ 𝜃 
𝜋𝑆(𝜃; 𝑇𝑆, 𝑧) =
{
 
 
 
   
1
1 + 𝑟
[𝜓𝑆𝜃𝑣𝛼]  − 𝑤𝑁𝑓𝑆,                    if 1 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 𝑇𝑆
1
1 + 𝑟
[𝜓𝑆 (
𝑇𝑆
𝜃
)
𝑧+𝑖
1−𝛼
 𝜃𝑣𝛼] − 𝑤𝑁𝑓𝑆,       if 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃
 
where 𝑟 ≥ 0 is the exogenous discount parameter.  
 
A research of Hayakawa et al. (2013) open up these risks a little bit more from the 
country-specific perspective. They made a research of 89 countries during the period 
from 1985 to 2007, and they investigate various elements of political and financial risks. 
Their data includes 56 developing countries, where one would especially assume that 
political risk is a potentially very harmful for FDI inflows. Many developing countries 
suffer from poor institutional quality which straightforwardly implies high political risk.  
Hayakawa et al. (2013) find that political risk is indeed adversely affected with FDI 
inflows. The more surprising finding is that the financial risk seems not to be adversely 
connected with FDI inflows. Countries with high political risk should be encouraged, 
because this research also points out that a decrease in the level of political risk also 
matters (a positive signal for FDI firms), not only the absolute level. Thus a very high risk 
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country is still able to attract some FDI, if the government is doing improvements related 
to these issues. Political risk may include many different components, and this research 
finds that especially internal conflict, corruption, military in politics, and bureaucracy 
quality have adverse effects for FDI inflows in developing countries. Political risk can 
therefore decrease the expected future profits for the FDI firms because of these 
harmful components. Another paper of Busse and Hefeker (2007) includes many 
indicators of political risk with data sample of 83 developing countries from year 1984 
to 2003. They find that government stability and law and order have the most significant 
negative harmful effects for developing countries. Other significant indicators with 
negative impacts on FDI flows are internal and external conflict, corruption, ethnic 
tensions, democratic accountability of government, and quality of bureaucracy.     
As mentioned earlier, financial risk may increase FDI flows (especially to developing 
countries) according to Hayakawa et al. (2013). Financial risk is the risk where the host 
country has difficulties to pay back its foreign liabilities. This surprising finding of 
financial risk should not be necessarily interpreted causally, because there is a reason 
behind this relationship. The FDI flows data of this research include not only green field 
FDI but also mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Local firms in financial trouble have a big 
chance to be merged with MNEs, and that’s why financial risk is associated with more 
FDI inflows. This kind of FDI is called a fire-sale FDI which happens during recessions and 
financial crises. If M&As are taken out of the data of FDI flows, I would question the 
result of no adverse relationship between financial risk and FDI inflows. Of course 
different industries might have different connections between the financial risk and FDI 
flows.           
 
Countries have to compete with each other in the field of country-specific risks, but it is 
very much possible that even industries within countries may vary when talking about 
risks of doing FDI. Many developing countries have vast natural resources and this makes 
resource-based sectors very attractive for foreign firms. One interesting industry-
specific risk for the resource-based sector is expropriation. Expropriation means that “a 
host-country government seizes company assets without fair compensation”, as Hajzler 
(2014) describes it. This kind of direct expropriation of a host government is becoming 
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less common in developing countries. On the other hand, Janeba (2002) mentions a 
term of “creeping expropriation” in his article which can imply high taxes or tariffs for 
the FDI firms. A wonderful example of this was Bolivia’s decision to suddenly raise tax 
levels of FDI revenues in two giant gas fields from 50 to 82 per cent in year 2006 
(Washington Post). This event obviously decreased the future profits for the operating 
FDI firms in Bolivia. This particular risk exists in other industries too, but it is much more 
acute in resource-based sector as Hajzler (2014) mentions. 
 
In spite of expropriation, the world has seen a continuing departments of FDI in risky 
resource-based sectors. Hajzler’s (2014) model actually suggests that FDI flows are 
higher in the extractive industries, when the expropriation risk is high. This suggests that 
there are some underlying incentives that attract the investments in these risky 
industries. This is exactly what Hajzler (2014) finds and points out that subsidies to 
foreign investments are an important part of the decision-making of FDI firms in this 
context. Janeba (2002) complements this finding by saying that the host governments 
give subsidies to FDI firms, so that these subsidies compensate the sunk costs of these 
firms. He also discusses the possibility of MNEs to have production in multiple countries 
simultaneously. In this case there might be competition between countries related to 
taxing or/and subsidizing FDI firms. The risk of a FDI firm to leave a country because of 
harmful policies can affect the thought process of the governments in developing 
countries.  
 
The final conclusion from all of this discussion is that politically risky countries have to 
make good deals with the FDI firms, if they want them to invest in their countries. The 
comparison between the expected revenues and costs in potential MNEs are going on 
all the time. The excepted high costs might not be harmful, if the expected revenues 
also are high enough. Especially in the extractive industries FDI flows are not as sensitive 
to political and financial risks as in some other industries (Hayakawa et al. 2013). The 
expected profits especially from natural resources might be so high that the FDI firms 
are willing to take these kind of risks. These previous examples illustrate just few 
possible risks that might affect the revenues of the FDI firms. They are though very 
important factors when FDI firms are making their decision to invest in developing 
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countries. In this thesis these risks are completely exogenous, but it would be easier to 
approximate the effect of the risks, if they were endogenized. This kind of extension is 
hopefully done in the future.          
 
6 Summary and discussion 
 
This thesis has been discussing an interesting and current topic of FDI from the 
perspective of developing countries. FDI is not a new phenomenon, but new and 
different countries has started to receive these investments in recent years. The 
standard FDI literature have found that FDI inflows can really help the economic 
development in poor countries. However, it is found that these countries need 
absorptive capacity in order to utilize these flows in the best possible way. A minimum 
threshold stock of human capital and economic freedom are found to be two very 
important features of absorptive capacity.  
The main model is supported by an empirical chapter of FDI from China to Sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA). This relationship has become evident in the last ten or twenty years. Lots 
of different aspects of this particular case are discussed, and the main focus is in various 
risks and possibilities related to these FDI flows. China’s interest in SSA has been 
concentrating on the extractive industry sectors, although the spectrum of different 
industries is widening all the time in China-SSA FDI. One of the most worrying case in 
SSA is found to be the lack of usage of local labor in Chinese MNEs. Chinese multinational 
firms might not want to reveal their newest technologies to the African workers, and 
this might hinder the technological spillover effect from Chinese MNEs to the local firms 
in developing countries. On the other hand, the possibilities in China-SSA FDI should be 
utilized for the benefit of people in SSA. The optimal solution could be a win-win 
situation where both Chinese FDI firms and people in SSA are better off. The worst case 
scenario is where Chinese FDI firms exploit resources, and the economic development 
in SSA suffers because of this event. The governments in SSA should impose laws and 
rules which prevent this kind of development.             
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The decision-making of FDI firms is a process of comparing costs and benefits in a foreign 
country. These firms can include many different factors into this process, but the 
technology frontier and the risk of FDI quality failure in a developing country are 
discussed more in detail in the main model of this thesis. This model is a North-South 
model with labor as only factor of production. A northern firm might have a higher 
technology level than the southern technology frontier is (in a given industry) which 
causes a risk of failure in production in the South. The lack of proper skills and knowledge 
of southern workers to use northern technologies is a risk for a possible MNE which 
might reduce the value of the production in the South. The most important finding of 
this model is that only northern firms with intermediate technology levels start doing 
FDI. Previous FDI models have not found this feature related to the technology levels of 
northern firms. They usually claim that firms with the highest technology move their 
production to the South.  
The main model is extended with southern imitation risk (with an innovative R&D 
sector), and it is found that the relationship between multinationalization and imitation 
is U-shaped. This feature (imitation) can be plugged into the profit functions of the main 
model. Higher IPR or lower imitation is found to decrease or increase 
multinationalization depending on the initial level of IPR in a given industry. After this, 
an extension of technology-neutral risks is made to include risks which can be common 
for all MNEs regardless of their technology levels. For example a political risk in the 
South is found to have an adverse effect on the future expected profits in the South. 
These kind of risks have to be discounted in the profit function of the South.        
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Appendix A  
 
The calculations in this Appendix A is based on the proofs of Chang and Lu (2012, 2011 
and 2010) apart from the proof of Proposition 3 which is done by the author of the 
thesis.  
Proof of Proposition 1: 
First we have to show that there exists a unique 𝑧∗(𝑇𝑆) such that ?̃?𝑆(𝜃;̃  ?̃?𝑆, 𝑧) is tangent 
to ?̃?𝑁(?̃?). Let ?̃?ϯ define the technology level where the two profit functions have the 
same slope. Therefore it follows that  
?̃?ϯ(?̃?𝑆, 𝑧) = [(1 −
𝑧
𝜈𝛼(1−𝛼)
)
𝜓𝑆
𝜓𝑁
]
𝜈𝛼(1−𝛼)
𝑧
?̃?𝑆                                                                            (29) 
?̃?ϯ exists and is bounded if and only if 0 < 𝑧 < 𝑧,̅ where 𝑧̅ ≡ (1 −
𝜓𝑆
𝜓𝑁
) 𝜈𝛼(1 − 𝛼). Let 
𝜙(?̃?𝑆, 𝑧) denote the distance between ?̃?𝑆(𝜃;̃  ?̃?𝑆, 𝑧) and ?̃?𝑁(?̃?) at the technology level 
?̃?ϯ. Then we have 
𝜙(?̃?𝑆, 𝑧) = 𝜓𝑁𝜃ϯ(?̃?𝑆, 𝑧)/𝑔(𝑧) − 𝑤𝑁(𝑓𝑆 − 𝑓𝑁)                                                                 (30) 
where 𝑔(𝑧) ≡
𝜈𝛼(1−𝛼)
𝑧
− 1. For ?̃?𝑆 ∈ [1, ?̃?𝑁𝑆) and 𝑧 ∈ (0, 𝑧̅), 
𝜕𝜙(?̃?𝑆,𝑧)
𝜕𝑧
< 0, lim
𝑧→0
𝜙(?̃?𝑆, 𝑧) → ∞, lim
𝑧→?̅?
𝜙(?̃?𝑆, 𝑧) 
= ?̃?𝑆(𝜓𝑆 − 𝜓𝑁) − 𝑤𝑁(𝑓𝑆 − 𝑓𝑁) < 0,                                                                                (31) 
where the first limit follows by applying L´Hospital´s Rule to ?̃?ϯ and 𝑔(𝑧). The sign of the 
second limit follows by the fact that ?̃?𝑆(𝜃;̃ ?̃?𝑆, 𝑧) is strictly dominated by ?̃?𝑁(?̃?) at ?̃? =
?̃?𝑆 < ?̃?𝑁𝑆. By the fixed point theorem, there exists a unique 𝑧
∗ ∈ (0, 𝑧̅), such that  
𝜙(?̃?𝑆,  𝑧∗) = 0                                                                                                                          (32) 
and ?̃?𝑆 is tangent to ?̃?𝑁. For 𝑧 < 𝑧∗ it follows from equation (31) that 𝜙(?̃?𝑆, 𝑧) > 0, and 
that leads to positive FDI flows. For 𝑇𝑆 = 𝜃𝑁𝑆, the profit function of the South rises 
above the profit function of the North to the right of 𝑇𝑆 = 𝜃𝑁𝑆  if and only if 𝑧 < 𝑧̅. This 
means that 𝑧∗(𝜃𝑁𝑆) = 𝑧̅. For 𝑇
𝑆 ∈ (𝜃𝑁𝑆, ∞), the profit function of the South lies strictly 
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above the profit function of the North at least for 𝜃 ∈ (𝜃𝑁𝑆, 𝑇
𝑆 + 𝜖], where 𝜖 > 0. This 
leads to a result that FDI takes place regardless of 𝑧.  
Next we show the existence and uniqueness of 𝑇𝑆
∗
(𝑧) for all 𝑧. From the above we know 
that 𝑧∗(1) is the cap of the risk sensitivity when the South’s technology frontier is at the 
lowest level 𝑇𝑆 = 1. For 𝑧 below the cap 𝑧∗(1) FDI always takes place, which means 
same thing as 𝑇𝑆
∗
(𝑧) = 1 for 𝑧 ∈ [0, 𝑧∗(1)]. For large enough risk sensitivity (𝑧 ≥ 𝑧̅) the 
profit function of the South is flatter than the profit function in the North for all 𝜃 > 𝑇𝑆. 
Thus, FDI will take place if and only if the technology frontier exceeds the risk-free cutoff 
level 𝜃𝑁𝑆, so 𝑇
𝑆∗(𝑧) = 𝜃𝑁𝑆 for 𝑧 ≥ 𝑧̅. 
To show the existence of a unique 𝑇𝑆
∗
(𝑧) for 𝑧 ∈ (𝑧∗(1), 𝑧̅) is equivalent to show the 
existence of a unique technology frontier level 𝑇𝑆
∗
∈ (1, 𝜃𝑁𝑆) such that ?̃?
𝑆 is tangent to 
?̃?𝑁 or equivalently  
𝜙(?̃?𝑆
∗
, 𝑧) = 0                                                                                                                           (33)                                                                                                                              
It is straightforward to verify that for ?̃?𝑆 ∈ (1,  ?̃?𝑁𝑆) and 𝑧 ∈ (𝑧
∗(1), 𝑧̅) that 
𝜕𝜙(?̃?𝑆,𝑧)
𝜕?̃?𝑆
> 0, lim
 ?̃?𝑆→1
𝜙(?̃?𝑆, 𝑧) < 0, lim
?̃?𝑆→ ?̃?𝑁𝑆
𝜙(?̃?𝑆, 𝑧) > 0.                                                   (34) 
We get the negative sign of the first limit by the fact that 𝜙(1,  𝑧∗(1)) = 0 and  
𝜕𝜙(1,𝑧)
𝜕𝑧
< 0. To get the positive sign of the second limit we use the fact that 𝜙(?̃?𝑆, 𝑧) is 
the unique maximum of the profit difference ?̃?𝑆(𝜃;̃ ?̃?𝑆, 𝑧) − ?̃?𝑁(?̃?). We also know that 
?̃?𝑆(𝜃;̃  ?̃?𝑆, 𝑧) − ?̃?𝑁(?̃?) = 0 holds at ?̃? = ?̃?𝑆 =  ?̃?𝑁𝑆 and that ?̃?
ϯ > ?̃?𝑆 and therefore we 
get the result. Thus, by the fixed point theorem, there exists a unique ?̃?𝑆
∗
∈ (1, ?̃?𝑁𝑆) 
for 𝑧 ∈ (𝑧∗(1), 𝑧̅), such that equation (33) is satisfied. 
Finally we want to show the relationship between 𝑇𝑆
∗
 and 𝑧 by taking the total 
differentiation of equation (33): 
𝑑?̃?𝑆
∗
𝑑𝑧
= −
𝜕𝜙(?̃?𝑆,𝑧)
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝜙(?̃?𝑆,𝑧)
𝜕?̃?𝑆
|  > 0   
?̃?𝑆 = ?̃?𝑆
∗
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It then follows that 
𝑑𝑇𝑆
∗
𝑑𝑧
= (
𝑑?̃?𝑆
∗
𝑑𝑧
) (
𝑑𝑇𝑆
∗
𝑑?̃?𝑆
∗) > 0 for 𝑧 ∈ (𝑧∗(1), 𝑧̅). We also have 
𝑑𝑇𝑆
∗
𝑑𝑧
= 0 
for 𝑧 ∈ [0, 𝑧∗(1)] and for 𝑧 ≥ 𝑧̅.  
 
Proof of Lemma 2:  
We know from (12) and (13) that 𝜋𝜃
𝑁(𝜃1) − 𝜋𝜃
𝑆(𝜃1) > 0 and 𝜋𝜃
𝑁(𝜃0) − 𝜋𝜃
𝑆(𝜃0) < 0. 
Then we also note that 𝜋
𝑇𝑆
𝑆 > 0 for 𝜃 > 𝑇𝑆 and 𝜋
𝑇𝑆
𝑆 = 0 for 𝜃 ≤ 𝑇𝑆. Now we get the 
signs of (14) and (15): 
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑇𝑆
=
⊕
⊕
> 0 and 
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑇𝑆
= {
⊕
⊖
< 0   if 1 ≤ 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆
0
⊖
= 0   if 𝜃𝑁𝑆 ≤ 𝑇
𝑆         
.  
 
Proof of Proposition 3: 
We have to verify the signs of 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜃0
, 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜃1
 and 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝑇𝑆
. Let’s first find the sign of 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜃0
: 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜃0
= {
−Ω𝑆𝑘(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼 [(𝜃0)
−𝑎−1] < 0,     if 1 ≤ 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆  
−Ω𝑆𝑘[(𝜃0)
−(𝑘−𝜈)−1] < 0,             if 𝜃𝑁𝑆 ≤ 𝑇
𝑆          
, 
 
and thus it follows that 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜃0
< 0 is always true. Next, let’s find the sign of 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜃1
: 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜃1
= {
Ω𝑆𝑘(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼 [(𝜃1)
−𝑎−1] > 0,             if 1 ≤ 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆  
Ω𝑆𝑘(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼 [(𝜃1)
−𝑎−1] > 0,             if 𝜃𝑁𝑆 ≤ 𝑇
𝑆          
, 
 
and thus it follows that 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜃1
> 0 is always true. Finally we have to find the sign of 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝑇𝑆
: 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝑇𝑆
=
{
 
 
 
 
𝑧
1 − 𝛼
Ω𝑆𝑘
𝑎
(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼−1 [(𝜃0)
−𝑎 − (𝜃1)
−𝑎] > 0,             if 1 ≤ 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆  
Ω𝑆𝑘[(𝑇𝑆)−(𝑘−𝜈)−1] +                 
𝑧
1 − 𝛼
Ω𝑆𝑘
𝑎
(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼−1[(𝑇𝑆)−𝑎 − (𝜃1)
−𝑎] − Ω𝑆𝑘[(𝑇𝑆)−(𝑘−𝜈)−1], if 𝜃𝑁𝑆 ≤ 𝑇
𝑆  
 
 
→
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝑇𝑆
=
{
 
 
𝑧
1 − 𝛼
Ω𝑆𝑘
𝑎
(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼−1 [(𝜃0)
−𝑎 − (𝜃1)
−𝑎] > 0,             if 1 ≤ 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆
𝑧
1 − 𝛼
Ω𝑆𝑘
𝑎
(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼−1[(𝑇𝑆)−𝑎 − (𝜃1)
−𝑎] > 0,              if 𝜃𝑁𝑆 ≤ 𝑇
𝑆        
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and thus it follows that 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝑇𝑆
> 0 is always true. Now we know all the crucial signs to give 
the proof of Λ, and it goes the following way:  
{
 
 
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
= ⊖⊖+⊕⊕+⊕ > 0,    if 1 ≤ 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
= ⊖ 0 +⊕⊕+⊕ > 0,      if 𝜃𝑁𝑆 ≤ 𝑇
𝑆        
 
and the final result is obtained: 
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
= Λ > 0 is always true.                                                                     
   
Proof of Lemma 4: 
We know from the properties of 𝑃𝑃 and 𝐿𝐿 curves that at a stable steady state 𝑃𝑃 
crosses 𝐿𝐿 from above. Analytically this means that the inverse of the slope of 𝑃𝑃 has 
to be higher than the slope of 𝐿𝐿. Thus, 
𝑑𝜒
𝑑𝑇𝑆
< [
𝑑Г
𝑑𝑋𝑆
]
−1
 or 
𝑑Г
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝜒
𝑑𝑇𝑆
< 1. We know that 
𝑑Г
𝑑𝑋𝑆
= 𝛿Г𝑄 and 
𝑑𝜒
𝑑𝑇𝑆
= Λ. Thus we have 𝛿Г𝑄Λ < 1 at a stable steady state.                                                             
 
Proof of Propositions 5-6: 
First of all we have to determine the signs of (25)-(28). We know from Lemma 4 that Σ =
1 − 𝛿Г𝑄Λ > 0 holds at a stable steady state. Also from earlier Λ > 0 and Г𝑄 > 0, 
𝜃1
𝑇𝑆
>
0 and 
𝜃0
𝑇𝑆
= {
< 0    if 1 ≤ 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆
0       if 𝜃𝑁𝑆 ≤ 𝑇
𝑆       
. We also have to note that based on the definition 
in (12)-(13) for the upper and lower bounds of the technology content it follows that 
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑞
≡ [𝜋𝜃
𝑁(𝜃1) − 𝜋𝜃
𝑆(𝜃1)]
−1
[𝜋𝑞
𝑆(𝜃1) − 𝜋𝑞
𝑁(𝜃1)] ,                                                            (35) 
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑞
≡ {
[𝜋𝜃
𝑁(𝜃0) − 𝜋𝜃
𝑆(𝜃0)]
−1
[𝜋𝑞
𝑆(𝜃0) − 𝜋𝑞
𝑁(𝜃0)],      if 1 ≤ 𝑇
𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆 
[𝜋𝜃
𝑁(𝜃𝑁𝑆) − 𝜋𝜃
𝑆(𝜃𝑁𝑆)]
−1
[𝜋𝑞
𝑆(𝜃𝑁𝑆) − 𝜋𝑞
𝑁(𝜃𝑁𝑆)],     if 𝜃𝑁𝑆 ≤ 𝑇
𝑆 
                       (36)  
where 𝜋𝑞
𝑙 ≡
𝜕𝜋𝑙
𝜕𝑞
 for 𝑙 ∈ {𝑁, 𝑆}. Next we want to determine the sign of Ξ ≡ (
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑞
+
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑞
+
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝑞
). It is already known that 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜃0
< 0 and 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜃1
> 0. Thus, we have to show the 
signs of 
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑞
,
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑞
 and 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝑞
. This is done by using the profit functions (10) and (11), and the 
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FDI aggregate production function (16), for each parameter. The derivations are done 
below in every different case of 𝑞.  
(i) 𝒒 = 𝑻𝟎
𝑺:  
𝑇0
𝑆 does not appear in the profit functions (10) and (11), and the FDI aggregate 
production function, so 
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆 = 0,
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆 = 0 and 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆 = 0. Thus we have Ξ = ⊖ 0 +
⊕ 0+ 0 = 0, and 
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇0
𝑆 = Σ
−1𝛿Г𝑄Ξ + Σ
−1𝑋𝑆Г𝑄
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆 + Σ
−1
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆 =⊕ 0 +⊕ 0 + Σ
−1 > 0 
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑇0
𝑆 = Ξ + Λ
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇0
𝑆 = 0 +⊕⊕ > 0 
𝑑𝜃1
𝑑𝑇0
𝑆 =
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆 +
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇0
𝑆 = 0 +⊕⊕ > 0 
𝑑𝜃0
𝑑𝑇0
𝑆 = 
{
 
 
 
 𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆 +
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇0
𝑆 = 0 + ⊖⊕ < 0          if 1 ≤  𝑇
𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆 = 0,                                                       if 𝜃𝑁𝑆  ≤  𝑇
𝑆        
 
 
(ii) 𝒒 = 𝜹𝑫: 
𝛿𝐷 does not appear in the profit functions (10) and (11), and the FDI aggregate 
production function (16) , so 
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝛿𝐷
= 0,
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝛿𝐷
= 0 and 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝛿𝐷
= 0. This gives us the sign 
of Ξ = ⊖ 0 +⊕ 0 + 0 = 0, and  
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝛿𝐷
= Σ−1𝛿Г𝑄Ξ + Σ
−1𝑋𝑆Г𝑄
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝛿𝐷
+ Σ−1
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆
𝜕𝛿𝐷
= ⊕ 0 +⊕⊖+⊕ 0 < 0 
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝛿𝐷
= Ξ + Λ
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝛿𝐷
= 0 +⊕⊖ < 0 
𝑑𝜃1
𝑑𝛿𝐷
=
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝛿𝐷
+
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝛿𝐷
= 0 +⊕⊖ < 0 
𝑑𝜃0
𝑑𝛿𝐷
= 
{
 
 
 
 𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝛿𝐷
+
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝛿𝐷
= 0 + ⊖⊖ > 0          if 1 ≤  𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝛿𝐷
= 0,                                                       if 𝜃𝑁𝑆  ≤  𝑇
𝑆        
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(iii) 𝒒 = 𝜹𝑳: 
 
𝛿𝐿 does not appear in the profit functions (10) and (11), and the FDI aggregate 
production function (16), so 
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝛿𝐿
= 0,
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝛿𝐿
= 0 and 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝛿𝐿
= 0. This gives us the sign 
of Ξ = ⊖ 0 +⊕ 0 + 0 = 0, and  
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝛿𝐿
= Σ−1𝛿Г𝑄Ξ + Σ
−1𝑋𝑆Г𝑄
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝛿𝐿
+ Σ−1
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆
𝜕𝛿𝐿
= ⊕ 0 +⊕⊕+⊕ 0 > 0 
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝛿𝐿
= Ξ + Λ
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝛿𝐿
= 0 +⊕⊕ > 0 
𝑑𝜃1
𝑑𝛿𝐿
=
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝛿𝐿
+
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝛿𝐿
= 0 +⊕⊕ > 0 
𝑑𝜃0
𝑑𝛿𝐿
= 
{
 
 
 
 𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝛿𝐿
+
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝛿𝐿
= 0 + ⊖⊕ < 0           if 1 ≤  𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝛿𝐿
= 0,                                                       if 𝜃𝑁𝑆  ≤  𝑇
𝑆        
 
 
 
(iv) 𝒒 = 𝒘𝑺: 
We have to use the profit functions (10) and (11) to find that 
𝜋
𝑤𝑆
𝑆 (𝜃) − 𝜋
𝑤𝑆
𝑁 (𝜃) =
𝜕𝜓𝑆
𝜕𝑤𝑆
(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼 𝜃𝜈𝛼− 
𝑧
1−𝛼 < 0,   for 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃 
𝜋
𝑤𝑆
𝑆 (𝜃) − 𝜋
𝑤𝑆
𝑁 (𝜃) =
𝜕𝜓𝑆
𝜕𝑤𝑆
𝜃𝜈𝛼 < 0,   for 𝜃 ≤ 𝑇𝑆 
Let’s plug the above signs into (35) and (36) to get the result that 
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑤𝑆
< 0 and 
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑤𝑆
> 0. Using (16) it is easy to see that  
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝑤𝑆
=
𝜕Ω𝑆
𝜕𝑤𝑆
𝜒
Ω𝑆
< 0, 
             because 
𝜕Ω𝑆
𝜕𝑤𝑆
< 0. After these calculations we are ready to find the sign of  
             Ξ = ⊖⊕+⊕⊖+⊖ < 0, and 
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑤𝑆
= Σ−1𝛿Г𝑄Ξ + Σ
−1𝑋𝑆Г𝑄
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝑤𝑆
+ Σ−1
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆
𝜕𝑤𝑆
= ⊕⊖+⊕ 0+⊕ 0 < 0 
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𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑤𝑆
= Ξ + Λ
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑤𝑆
= ⊖ +⊕⊖ < 0 
𝑑𝜃1
𝑑𝑤𝑆
=
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑤𝑆
+
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑤𝑆
= ⊖ +⊕⊖ < 0 
𝑑𝜃0
𝑑𝑤𝑆
= {
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑤𝑆
+
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑤𝑆
= ⊕+⊖⊖ > 0         if 1 ≤  𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑤𝑆
> 0,                                                       if 𝜃𝑁𝑆  ≤  𝑇
𝑆        
 
 
(v) 𝒒 = 𝒇𝑺: 
Using the profit functions (10) and (11) we note that 
𝜋
𝑓𝑆
𝑆 (𝜃) − 𝜋
𝑓𝑆
𝑁 (𝜃) = −𝑤𝑁 < 0. 
Plug the above sign into (35) and (36) to get the result that 
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑓𝑆
< 0 and 
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑓𝑆
> 0. 
We also know that 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝑓𝑆
= 0, because 𝑓𝑆 does not exist in (16), and thus  
Ξ = ⊖⊕+⊕⊖+ 0 < 0, and 
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑓𝑆
= Σ−1𝛿Г𝑄Ξ + Σ
−1𝑋𝑆Г𝑄
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝑓𝑆
+ Σ−1
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆
𝜕𝑓𝑆
= ⊕⊖+⊕0 +⊕ 0 < 0, 
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑓𝑆
= Ξ + Λ
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑓𝑆
= ⊖ +⊕⊖ < 0, 
𝑑𝜃1
𝑑𝑓𝑆
=
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑓𝑆
+
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑓𝑆
= ⊖ +⊕⊖ < 0, 
𝑑𝜃0
𝑑𝑓𝑆
= 
{
 
 
 
 𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑓𝑆
+
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑓𝑆
= ⊕ +⊖⊖ > 0, if 1 ≤  𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑓𝑆
> 0,                                                       if 𝜃𝑁𝑆  ≤  𝑇
𝑆        
               
 
(vi) 𝒒 = 𝒛: 
Using the profit functions (10) and (11) we note that 
𝜋𝑧
𝑆(𝜃) − 𝜋𝑧
𝑁(𝜃) =
1
1 − 𝛼
𝜓𝑆(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼 𝜃𝜈𝛼−
𝑧
1−𝛼 (ln 𝑇𝑆 − ln𝜃) < 0, for 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃  
𝜋𝑧
𝑆(𝜃) − 𝜋𝑧
𝑁(𝜃) = 0, for 𝜃 ≤ 𝑇𝑆  
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Plug the signs above into (35) and (36), and we find that 
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑧
< 0, 
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑧
> 0 if  
1 ≤  𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆 and 
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑧
= 0 if 𝜃𝑁𝑆  ≤  𝑇
𝑆.  
Next we use (16) to note that if 1 ≤  𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆, 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝑧
= −
1
1 − 𝛼
Ω𝑆𝑘
𝛼
(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼[𝐽(𝜃0) − 𝐽(𝜃1)] 
where 𝐽(𝜃) ≡ (
1
𝛼
− ln
𝑇𝑆
𝜃
) 𝜃−𝑎, which is flat at 𝜃 = 𝑇𝑆 and decreasing                               
everywhere for 1 ≤ 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃. Now, in this case we have 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃0 < 𝜃1, and it 
follows   that 𝐽(𝜃0) − 𝐽(𝜃1) > 0 and  
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝑧
< 0. In the case of 𝜃𝑁𝑆 ≤ 𝑇
𝑆, 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝑧
= −
1
1 − 𝛼
Ω𝑆𝑘
𝛼
(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼[𝐽(𝑇𝑆) − 𝐽(𝜃1)], 
We know that 𝐽(𝑇𝑆) − 𝐽(𝜃1) > 0 because 𝑇
𝑆 < 𝜃1, thus it follows that 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝑧
< 0. 
Now we can find that Ξ = ⊖⊕+⊕⊖+⊖ < 0, if 1 ≤ 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆, and 
Ξ = ⊖ 0 +⊕⊖+⊖ < 0, if 𝜃𝑁𝑆  ≤  𝑇
𝑆. Finally we find the following results, 
which are 
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑧
= Σ−1𝛿Г𝑄Ξ + Σ
−1𝑋𝑆Г𝑄
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝑧
+ Σ−1
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆
𝜕𝑧
= ⊕⊖+ ⊕ 0 +⊕ 0 < 0, 
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑧
= Ξ + Λ
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑧
= ⊖ +⊕⊖ < 0, 
𝑑𝜃1
𝑑𝑧
=
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑧
+
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑧
= ⊖+⊕⊖ < 0, 
𝑑𝜃0
𝑑𝑧
=  {
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑧
+
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑧
= ⊕+⊖⊖ > 0, if 1 ≤  𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑧
= 0,                                                       if 𝜃𝑁𝑆  ≤  𝑇
𝑆        
 
 
       (vii) 𝒒 = 𝝆:  
               
               First we use the profit functions (10) and (11) to obtain 
𝜋𝜌
𝑆(𝜃) − 𝜋𝜌
𝑁(𝜃) = 𝛼
𝜕𝜈
𝜕𝜌
[𝜓𝑆(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼 𝜃𝜈𝛼−
𝑧
1−𝛼 −𝜓𝑁𝜃𝜈𝛼] ln 𝜃 , for 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃, 
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                              =  𝛼
𝜕𝜈
𝜕𝜌
[𝑤𝑁(𝑓𝑆 − 𝑓𝑁)] ln 𝜃 < 0, for 𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃 =  {𝜃0, 𝜃1}, 
           𝜋𝜌
𝑆(𝜃) − 𝜋𝜌
𝑁(𝜃) = 𝛼
𝜕𝜈
𝜕𝜌
[𝜓𝑆𝜃𝜈𝛼 −𝜓𝑁𝜃𝜈𝛼] ln 𝜃 < 0, for 𝜃 ≤ 𝑇𝑆    
where the fact of 
𝜕𝜈
𝜕𝜌
< 0 is utilized. By plugging these two negative signs into 
(35) and (36) we get the results of 
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝜌
< 0 and 
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝜌
> 0. We yet need the sign 
of 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜌
 in order to get the sign of Ξ: 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜌
= −
𝜕𝑎
𝜕𝜌
Ω𝑆𝑘
𝑎
(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼[𝐽(𝜃0, 𝑎) − 𝐽(𝜃1, 𝑎)], if 1 ≤ 𝑇
𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆 
where 
𝜕𝑎
𝜕𝜌
> 0 and 𝐽(𝜃, 𝑟) ≡ (
1
𝑟
+ ln 𝜃) 𝜃−𝑟, which is a decreasing function of 𝜃 
for any 𝑟 > 0 and 𝜃 > 1. Thus we know that 𝐽(𝜃0, 𝑎) − 𝐽(𝜃1, 𝑎) > 0 and 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜌
<
0. On the other hand, when 𝑇𝑆 ≥ 𝜃𝑁𝑆 we have 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜌
= −
𝜕(𝑘 − 𝜈)
𝜕𝜌
Ω𝑆𝑘
(𝑘 − 𝜈)
[𝐽(𝜃0, 𝑘 − 𝜈) − 𝐽(𝑇
𝑆, 𝑘 − 𝜈)] 
−
𝜕𝑎
𝜕𝜌
Ω𝑆𝑘
𝑎
(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼 [𝐽(𝑇𝑆, 𝑎) − 𝐽(𝜃1, 𝑎)]       
where 
𝜕(𝑘−𝜈)
𝜕𝜌
> 0. The decreasing property of function 𝐽(𝜃, 𝑟) gives us 
𝐽(𝜃0, 𝑘 − 𝜈) − 𝐽(𝑇
𝑆, 𝑘 − 𝜈) > 0 and 𝐽(𝑇𝑆, 𝑎) − 𝐽(𝜃1, 𝑎) > 0. The following 
result is 
𝜕𝜒
𝜕𝜌
< 0. Now we know that Ξ = ⊖⊕+ ⊕⊖+⊖ < 0 and 
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝜌
= Σ−1𝛿Г𝑄Ξ + Σ
−1𝑋𝑆Г𝑄
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝜌
+ Σ−1
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆
𝜕𝜌
= ⊕⊖+⊕ 0+⊕ 0 < 0 
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝜌
= Ξ + Λ
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝜌
= ⊖ +⊕⊖ < 0 
𝑑𝜃1
𝑑𝜌
=
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝜌
+
𝜕𝜃1
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝜌
= ⊖+⊕⊖ < 0 
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𝑑𝜃0
𝑑𝜌
=  
{
 
 
 
 𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝜌
+
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝜌
= ⊕ +⊖⊖ > 0, if 1 ≤  𝑇𝑆 < 𝜃𝑁𝑆
𝜕𝜃0
𝜕𝜌
> 0,                                                       if 𝜃𝑁𝑆  ≤  𝑇
𝑆        
.              
 
Appendix B 
 
This Appendix B is fully based on the author’s calculations. 
The minimized unit production cost in Eq. (3) is obtained by substituting 𝜆(𝑠) into the 
cost function ∫ 𝑤𝑙
𝜃
0
𝜆(𝑠)𝑑𝑠: 
∫ 𝑤𝑙
𝜃
0
𝜆(𝑠)𝑑𝑠 = 𝑤𝑙 ∫ 𝑥𝜃
−
1
𝜌
𝜃
0
𝑑𝑠 =  𝑤𝑙𝜃
−
1
𝜌 ∫ 𝑥
𝜃
0
𝑑𝑠 = 𝑤𝑙𝜃
1−
1
𝜌 = 𝑤𝑙𝜃
𝜌−1
𝜌 .                            
The optimal output level of country 𝑙 in Eq. (7) is obtained by maximizing the profit 
function in Eq. (6): 
𝜕𝜋𝑙(𝜃)
𝜕𝑥
= 𝛼𝛾𝑙(𝜃)𝑥𝛼−1 − 𝑐𝑙(𝜃) = 0 
→  𝛼𝛾𝑙(𝜃)𝑥𝛼−1 = 𝑐𝑙(𝜃)   → 𝑥𝛼−1 =
𝑐𝑙(𝜃)
𝛼𝛾𝑙(𝜃)
   → 𝑥𝑙(𝜃) = (
𝑐𝑙(𝜃)
𝛼𝛾𝑙(𝜃)
)
1
𝛼−1
    
→ 𝒙𝒍(𝜽) = (
𝛼𝛾𝑙(𝜃)
𝑐𝑙(𝜃)
)
1
1−𝛼
. 
 
The optimal output levels (8) and (9) for the North and South respectively are obtained 
by substituting Eq. (3), (4) and (5) into Eq. (7): 
𝒙𝑵(𝜽) = (
𝛼
𝑤𝑁𝜃
𝜌−1
𝜌
)
1
1−𝛼
= (
𝛼
𝑤𝑁
)
1
1−𝛼
(
1
𝜃
𝜌−1
𝜌
)
1
1−𝛼
= (
𝛼
𝑤𝑁
)
1
1−𝛼
𝜃
(
1−𝜌
𝜌 )(
1
1−𝛼) = Ω𝑁𝜃𝜈 
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𝒙𝑺(𝜽) =
{
  
 
  
 
(
𝛼
𝑤𝑆𝜃
𝜌−1
𝜌
)
1
1−𝛼
= Ω𝑆𝜃𝜈                                              , if 1 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ TS                   
[
𝛼(
𝑇𝑆
𝜃
)
𝑧
𝑤𝑆𝜃
𝜌−1
𝜌
]
1
1−𝛼
= (
𝛼
𝑤𝑆
)
1
1−𝛼
[𝜃
(
1−𝜌
𝜌
)
(
𝑇𝑆
𝜃
)
𝑧
]
1
1−𝛼
= Ω𝑆 (
𝑇𝑆
𝜃
)
𝑧
1−𝛼
𝜃𝜈      , if TS < 𝜃 
        
where Ω𝑙 ≡ (
𝛼
𝑤𝑙
)
1
1−𝛼
 and 𝜈 ≡ (
1−𝜌
𝜌
) (
1
1−𝛼
) > 0. 
 
The aggregate production of the MNEs in a given industry in the South (Eq.(16)) is 
obtained by first integrating the first part of 𝜒(𝜃0, 𝜃1, 𝑇
𝑆) in the area of TS < θNS by 
using Eq.(9):  
𝜒(𝜃0, 𝜃1, 𝑇
𝑆) = ∫ 𝑥𝑆(𝜃)𝑑𝐺(𝜃)
𝜃1
𝜃0
= ∫ Ω𝑆(𝑇𝑆) 
𝑧
1−𝛼 𝜃𝜈− 
𝑧
1−𝛼 𝑑𝐺(𝜃)
𝜃1
𝜃0
= ∫ Ω𝑆(𝑇𝑆) 
𝑧
1−𝛼  𝜃𝜈− 
𝑧
1−𝛼  𝑘𝜃−𝑘−1𝑑𝜃
𝜃1
𝜃0
= Ω𝑆(𝑇𝑆) 
𝑧
1−𝛼 𝑘 ∫ 𝜃𝜈−
𝑧
1−𝛼−
(𝑘+1)𝑑𝜃
𝜃1
𝜃0
=Ω𝑆(𝑇𝑆) 
𝑧
1−𝛼  
𝑘
𝜈 −
𝑧
1 − 𝛼 − 𝑘
∫ 𝜃𝜈−
𝑧
1−𝛼−𝑘
𝜃1
𝜃0
=
Ω𝑆𝑘
𝑎
(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼 (𝜃0
−𝑎 − 𝜃1
−𝑎) 
where 𝑎 ≡
𝑧
1−𝛼
+ 𝑘 − 𝜈 and 𝑎 >
𝑧
1−𝛼
> 0. 
 
The second part of 𝜒(𝜃0, 𝜃1, 𝑇
𝑆) in the area of θNS ≤ T
S we get again by using Eq.(9):  
∫ Ω𝑆𝜃𝜈𝑑𝐺(𝜃)
𝑇𝑆
𝜃𝑁𝑆
+∫ Ω𝑆(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼 𝜃𝜈−
𝑧
1−𝛼 𝑑𝐺(𝜃)  
𝜃1
𝑇𝑆
 
 
→ Let’s now integrate these two parts separately: 
 71 
 
∫ Ω𝑆𝜃𝜈𝑑𝐺(𝜃)
𝑇𝑆
𝜃𝑁𝑆
= ∫ Ω𝑆𝜃𝜈
𝑇𝑆
𝜃𝑁𝑆
𝑘𝜃−𝑘−1𝑑𝜃 = Ω𝑆𝑘∫ 𝜃𝜈−𝑘−1𝑑𝜃
𝑇𝑆
𝜃𝑁𝑆
=
Ω𝑆𝑘
𝜈 − 𝑘
∫ 𝜃𝜈−𝑘 =
𝑇𝑆
𝜃𝑁𝑆
 
Ω𝑆𝑘
(𝑘 − 𝜈)
[𝜃𝑁𝑆
𝜈−𝑘 − (𝑇𝑆)𝜈−𝑘] =
Ω𝑆𝑘
(𝑘 − 𝜈)
[(𝜃0)
−(𝑘−𝜈) − (𝑇𝑆)−(𝑘−𝜈)] 
 
→ Then the second part of this calculation: 
∫ Ω𝑆(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼 𝜃𝜈−
𝑧
1−𝛼 𝑑𝐺(𝜃) = 
𝜃1
𝑇𝑆
∫ Ω𝑆(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼 𝜃𝜈−
𝑧
1−𝛼 𝑘𝜃−𝑘−1𝑑𝜃 
𝜃1
𝑇𝑆
 
= Ω𝑆(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼 𝑘 ∫ 𝜃𝜈−
𝑧
1−𝛼−𝑘−1 𝑑𝜃 = Ω𝑆(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼
𝑘
𝜈 −
𝑧
1 − 𝛼 − 𝑘
∫ 𝜃𝜈−
𝑧
1−𝛼−𝑘
𝜃1
𝑇𝑆
𝜃1
𝑇𝑆
 
=
Ω𝑆𝑘
𝑎
(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼[(𝑇𝑆)−𝑎 − (𝜃1)
−𝑎] 
 
→ Now when we combine all these calculations we get the result we wanted: 
→ 𝜒(𝜃0, 𝜃1, 𝑇
𝑆) =
{
  
 
  
 
 
Ω𝑆𝑘
𝑎
(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼 [(𝜃0)
−𝑎 − (𝜃1)
−𝑎],     if 1 ≤ TS < θNS,
Ω𝑆𝑘
(𝑘 − 𝜈)
[(𝜃0)
−(𝑘−𝜈) − (𝑇𝑆)−(𝑘−𝜈)] +                             
Ω𝑆𝑘
𝑎
(𝑇𝑆)
𝑧
1−𝛼[(𝑇𝑆)−𝑎 − (𝜃1)
−𝑎],          if θNS ≤ T
S
     . 
 
Eq.(25) can be calculated by taking the total differentiation of Eq.(21) wrt. 𝑋𝑆, 𝑇𝑆 and 𝑞: 
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑞
=
𝜕𝑋𝑆
𝜕𝑞
+
𝜕𝑋𝑆
𝜕𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑞
+
𝜕𝑋𝑆
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑞
= Ξ + Λ
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑞
  
where Ξ and Λ are already known from the earlier analysis.  
 
Eq.(26) we obtain by taking the total differentiation of Eq.(20) with respect to 𝑋𝑆 , 𝑇𝑆 
and 𝑞, and by substituting the expression in Eq.(25) for 
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑞
: 
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑞
=
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝜕𝑞
+
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝜕𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑋𝑆
𝑑𝑞
+
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑞
 
→
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑞
= 𝛿Г𝑄  (Ξ + Λ
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑞
) +
𝜕𝑇𝑆
𝜕𝑞
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→ (1 − 𝛿Г𝑄Λ)
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑞
= 𝛿Г𝑄Ξ + Г𝑄𝑋
𝑆
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝑞
+
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆
𝜕𝑞
 
→ 
𝑑𝑇𝑆
𝑑𝑞
= 𝛿Σ−1Г𝑄Ξ + Σ
−1Г𝑄𝑋
𝑆
𝜕𝛿
𝜕𝑞
+ Σ−1
𝜕𝑇0
𝑆
𝜕𝑞
 
where Σ = 1 − 𝛿Г𝑄Λ.                                   
